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EXTRAORDINARY JUSTICE
Abstract
This article is squarely opposed to views advanced by Eric Posner, Adrian
Vermeule, and others that transitional justice is just a special case of “Ordinary
Justice.” Paying special attention to debates about reparations, this article
argues that transitional justice is extraordinary, reflecting the source and nature
of atrocities perpetrated under an abusive regime, and focused on the challenges
and goals that define transitions to democracy. In particular, this Article argues
that transitional justice is not profane, preservative, and retrospective, but,
rather, Janus-faced, liminal, and transformative.
The literature on reparations in transitions is divided between critics who
regard reparations as quasi-tort awards that violate basic commitments to
individual fairness and those who appeal to collective responsibility, atonement,
or reconciliation as special transitional justice theories. These debates have not
reached a persuasive resolution because both camps fail to recognize and take
full normative account of the extraordinary conditions in abusive regimes. What
distinguishes pre-transitional abuses from ordinary crime is the role played by an
abusive paradigm. An abusive paradigm is a combination of social norms, law,
and institutional practice that utilizes a bi-polar logic to justify targeted violence.
Abusive paradigms gain authority after the collapse of dynamic stability—the
overlapping network of associations and oppositions that restricts violence and
violent impulses in stable regimes. Once dominant, abusive paradigms
rationalize and enforce a pathological status inequality that excludes those in an
oppressed group from cross-secting identities, allowing abusers to regard them as
appropriate targets for exclusion and abuse.
The primary task in transition is to seize the liminal moment between an
abusive past and a future committed to human rights, democracy, and the rule of
law in order to achieve some level of parity between victims and abusers, in part
by creating or reconstituting the network of overlapping identities reflective of a
dynamically stable society. Reparations and other transitional justice tools,
liberated from the constraints of ordinary justice models, have a role to play in
this extraordinary endeavor as sites for what Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks has called
“effective norm change.” For example, symbolic reparations can provide official
recognition of victims. Material reparations can provide former victims with
meaningful access to spheres of public and private life once denied to them as a
consequence of their status. Treating reparations as part of the extraordinary
endeavor of social transformation also provides ready responses to common
objections, including those prominent in debates about historical reparations.
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I.

Ordinary Justice
“This storm is what we call progress.”
—Walter Benjamin1

Transitional justice asks what a successor regime committed to democracy, human rights,
and the rule of law can and should do to achieve justice for the targeted violence and
institutionalized human rights abuses perpetrated by and under a predecessor regime.2 This is
the question Athenians faced upon the fall of the twelve tyrants.3 More recently, “Third Wave”
democracy movements4 have led to an explosion in the literature on transitional justice5 and have
spawned wide-ranging interdisciplinary exchange,6 a dedicated Oxford journal,7 specialized
1

Walter Benjamin, Ninth Thesis on the Philosophy of History, in Illuminations: Essays and
Reflections 257-58 (Hannah Arendt ed., 1968); see infra Part VIII.

2

David Gray, An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2621,
2621-23 (2006); Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair:
Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 Hum. Rts. Q. 573, 574 (2002).

3

Jon Elster, Closing the Books, 3-23 (2004); Plato, Apology 32b-e (G.M.A. Grube, trans. 1981).

4

See generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century (1991).

5

Kieran McEvoy, Letting Go of Legalism: Developing a “Thicker” Version of Transitional
Justice, in Transitional Justice from Below 15 (Kieran McEvoy & Lorna McGregor, eds.,
2008); Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 574.

6

Contemporary conversations about transitional justice began with a debate in print between
Professors Diane Orentlicher and Carlos Nino published in the Yale Law Journal. See Diane
Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior
Regime, 100 Yale L.J. 2537 (1991); Carlos Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human
Rights Put into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 Yale L.J. 2619 (1991); Diane Orentlicher,
A Reply to Professor Nino, 100 Yale L.J. 2641 (1991).

7

International Journal of Transitional Justice. http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org.
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centers and centres in law schools and universities,8 and a high-profile NGO that advises
transitional regimes on topics ranging from constitutionalism to economic reform and justice
programs.9 The instinct in transitions is to prosecute and punish everyone.10 Unfortunately,
transitions have limited political and material resources that fall far short of what is necessary to
satisfy a host of demands ranging from economic reform to infrastructure reconstruction.11 As a
consequence, most transitions cannot punish everyone associated with past wrongs and
international tribunals, including the International Criminal Court, simply cannot make up the
difference.12 In the face of this “justice gap,”13 transitional states usually adopt a hybrid
approach to transitional justice featuring limited criminal prosecutions that focus on high-level
leaders, truth commissions, and reparations.14
8

See, e.g., New York University’s Transitional Justice Project,
www.chrgj.org/projects/transitional.html; Transitional Justice Institute at Ulster University,
www.transitionaljustice.ulster.ac.uk.

9

International Center for Transitional Justice, www.ictj.org.

10

Boraine, supra note 31, at 203; Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of
Truth Commissions 12 (2002); Lisa Laplante & Kimberly Teidon, Truth and Consequences:
Justice and Reparations in Post-Truth Commission Peru, 29 Hum. Rts. Q. 228, 242-43 (2007);
Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 575.

11

Laplante &Teidon, supra note 10, at 243.

12

Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 579, 584.

13

Christine Bell & Catherine O’Rourke, Does Feminism Need A Theory of Transitional Justice,
1 Int’l J. of Transitional J. 23, 35 (2007) (citing Gray, supra note 2, at 2624-29).

14

Stef Vandeginste, Reparation, in Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook 145, 161
(David Bloomfield & Luc Huyse, eds., 2003); Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 579-80,
605, 625. As examples, reparations have been part of transitional justice efforts in Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Germany, Japan, Malawi, South Africa, and The United States. See
The Handbook of Reparations, 21-450 (Pablo De Greiff ed., 2008); Hayner, supra note 10, at
7.
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In a characteristically clear-headed essay, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule define
reparations as “payment[s] justified on backward-looking grounds of corrective justice, rather
than forward looking grounds such as the deterrence of future wrongdoing.”15 Posner and
Vermeule are skeptical of most reparations programs, but Alfred Brophy, who is far more
sympathetic to reparations claims generally, agrees with this definition, noting that reparations
claims are about remedying “long-ago crimes.”16 On this view, reparations are exclusively
retrospective and focused on compensation for past harm, measured historically or
counterfactually.17 This approach to reparations reflects a broader view held by Posner,

15

Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103
Colum. L. Rev. 689, 691 (2003). See also Rodney C. Roberts, The Counterfactual Conception
of Compensation, in Genocide’s Aftermath 132 (Claudia Card and Armen T. Marsoobian, eds.,
2007) (limiting the “species of justice” to “distributive justice and rectificatory justice”).
“Reparations” here are to be distinguished from “restitution,” which, rather than compensating
for harm, simply seeks to return that which was taken. While the distinction may appear
muddy in some cases, the line is between compensating for a measurable loss and
compensating for harm done or wrong suffered. Claims for return of seized property therefore
are claims for restitution. Claims for damages based on the wrongfulness of that seizure are
claims for reparation. The central claim of this article is that reparations programs ought focus
on the source and nature of the targeted wrongs central to transitional justice. See infra Part
VI.

16

Alfred Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery and the Tort Law Analogy, 24 B.C.
Third World L.J. 81, 131(2004); see also Lisa Laplante, The Law of Remedies and the Clean
Hands Doctrine: Exclusionary Reparation Policies in Peru’s Political Transition, 23 Am. U.
Int’l L. Rev. 51, 57-58 (2007); Eric Yamamoto, et al., American Reparations Theory and
Practice at the Crossroads, 44 Cal. W. L. Rev. 1, 35-37 (2007) (noting the retrospective
justification of reparations claims).

17

Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness 104 (1998); Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as
Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707, 1784 (1993); Brophy, Reparations Talk, supra note 16, at
133; Lisa Magarrell, Reparations for Massive or Widespread Human Rights Violations, 22
Windsor Y.B. Access to Just. 85, 89n.9 (2003); see also Basic Principles and Guidelines on
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. (IX) 60/147,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/147 (March 21, 2006); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Art. IV(2), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Art. 79(2) (2002). For a description of these two
6
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Vermeule, and others that transitional justice is just a special case of ordinary justice.18
Reparations on this view are much like familiar tort remedies, though usually justified on
political rather than purely legal grounds.19 This ordinary justice approach to reparations makes
almost inevitable a host of objections based on “ethical individualism,” which holds “that only
individuals have moral rights and duties” such that individuals can only be held accountable for
their own conduct and not that of others, with a few exceptions.20 That individualism has
significant resonance in the common law and is almost axiomatic in American criminal
jurisprudence. Writing for the Court in Morissette v. United States, for example, Justice Jackson
noted that “an intense individualism” is at the heart of the “compound concept” of criminal
liability constituted by the “concurrence of an evil-meaning mind and an evil-doing hand” that
“took deep and early root in American soil.”21
Ethical individualism spawns a host of objections to reparations, all of which are
variations on a simple theme: “It wasn’t me.”22 Take as an example debates in the United States

approaches to measuring harm and compensation see Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and
Utopia 57 (1974); Roberts, supra note 15, at 133-34; Joel Feinberg, Wrongful Life and the
Counterfactual Element in Harming, in Freedom and Fulfillment 7 (1992).
18

Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 Harv. L. Rev.
761 (2004).

19

Posner & Vermeule, supra note 15, at 691.

20

Id. at 703. See also Lee Harris, “Reparations” as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery
Reparations, 33 U. Mem. L. Rev. 409, 414-20 (2003).

21

Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 146 (1952).

22

See, e.g., Roy Brooks, When Sorry Isn’t Enough: The Controversy Over Apologies and
Reparations 7-9 (Roy Brooks, ed., 1999); Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsibility for Historical
Injustices: Reconceiving the Case for Reparations, 22 J. L. & Pol. 183 (2006); Lawrie Balfour,
Reparations After Identity Politics, 33 Political Theory 786, 794 (2005); Mark Osiel, The
7
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over reparations for slavery.23 Contemporary whites asked to contribute directly or through taxes
protest that they never owned slaves,24 that nobody in their family ever owned slaves,25 and that,
at any rate, they were born generations after the practice was abolished.26 Critics also point out
that the proposed beneficiaries were never themselves slaves and therefore do not have standing
to raise a claim.27 These objectors acknowledge, as has the United States Senate,28 that slavery

Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1751, 176568 (2005); Thomas McCarthy, Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and
Politics of Reparations for Slavery, 32 Political Theory 750, 752-53 (2004); Eric Miller,
Reconceiving Reparations: Multiple Strategies in the Reparations Debate, 24 B.C. Third
World L.J. 45, 49-52 (2004); Roy L. Brooks, Getting Reparations for Slavery Right—A
Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 251, 256-57, 279-80 (2004)
[hereinafter Brooks, Getting Reparations Right]; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 15, at 691,
698-704 (2003); Charles Ogletree, The Current Reparations Debate, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
1051, 1052 (2003).
23

See generally, Should America Pay? Slavery and the Raging Debate on Reparations (Raymond
Winbush, ed., 2003); Joe R. Feagin, Racist America: Roots, Current Realities, and Future
Reparations (2000); Sepinwall supra note 22; Brooks, supra note 22; Posner & Vermeule,
supra note 15; Robert Tracinski, America’s ‘Field of the Blackbirds’: How the Campaign for
Reparations for Slavery Perpetuates Racism, 3 J.L. Soc’y 145 (2002); Comment, Reparations
for Slavery: A Dream Deferred, 3 San Diego Int’l L.J. 177 (2002). See also Race, Rights, and
Reparations: Law and the Japanese American Internment (Eric Yamamoto, et al., eds., 2001).

24

See Sepinwall, supra note 22, at 184 n. 10 (quoting Rep. Henry Hyde as claim that “I never
owned a slave. I never oppressed anybody. I don’t know that I should have to pay for
someone who did generations before I was born.”).

25

Balfour, supra note 22, at 794. For example, Sen. John McCain famously denied that his
family owned slaves when, in fact, they did. See Douglas Blackmon, Two Families Named
McCain, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 2008, A1.

26

Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure, in Affirmative Action and the Constitution 83, 88
(Gabriel Chin, ed., 1998); Tracinski, supra note 23, at 151; see also Bob Gibson, Slavery
Apology Measure Ignites Legislative Debate, Charlottesville Daily Prog., Jan. 16, 2007
(quoting Del. Frank Hargrove in opposition to a proposed resolution apologizing for slavery as
saying “The present Commonwealth has nothing to do with slavery.”).

27

Miller, supra note 22, at 52; Tracinski, supra note 23, at 151. This view is not without critics
of its own. For example, Cheryl Harris famously argued that the continuing injustices of
8
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and Jim Crow were wrong, but maintain that because they have no personal or direct connection
to past abuses, they cannot be liable for compensation claims.29 “It wasn’t them,” so forcing
them to pay for “reparations would be a gross injustice, punishing innocent people for a crime
they did not commit.”30
Similar objections dominate other transitional justice debates.31 Contemporary
transitions do not face the historical concerns that confront proposals for slavery reparations.
However, the objections are familiar.32 Many asked to pay disclaim the past regime and contend

slavery and Jim Crow are so ubiquitous in American society that whites have become
accustomed to asserting a property interest in their racial identities. Harris, supra note 17, at
1714-15. See also McCarthy, supra note 22, at 758-64 and Randall Robinson, What America
Owes Blacks and What Blacks Owe to Each Other, 6 Afr.-Am. L. & Pol’y Rep. 1, 2 (2004)
(documenting racial disparities in imprisonment rates and home ownership). The United States
Senate recently acknowledged these continuing effects. See Con. Res. 26, 11th Cong. (2009)
(“African-Americans continue to suffer from the consequences of slavery and Jim Crow
laws—long after both systems were formally abolished—through enormous damage and loss,
both tangible and intangible, including the loss of human dignity and liberty.”).
28

Con. Res. 26, 11th Cong. (2009) (maintaining that “Nothing in this resolution authorizes or
supports any claim against the United States”).

29

Roy Brooks, Toward a Perpetrator-Focused Model of Slave Redress, 6 Afr. Am. L. & Pol’y
Rep. 49, 61 (2004); Gregory Kane, Why the Reparations Movement Should Fail, 3 Margins
189, 198 (2003).

30

Tracinski, supra note 23, at 146.

31

See, e.g., Alex Boraine, A Life in Transition 190-91 (2008); Karl Jaspers, The Question of
German Guilt 41-43 (1948). As I will argue in Part VII, claims for slavery reparations, and
other “historic abuses,” present transitional justice questions and are amenable to the
extraordinary justice approach advanced in this Article.

32

See generally The Handbook of Reparations, supra note 14; Michael Henderson, Forgiveness:
Breaking the Chain of Hate (2d rev. ed. 2003); Human Rights in Development: Yearbook 2001
(George Ulrich & Louise Krabbe Boserup eds., 2003); Politics and The Past: On Repairing
Historical Injustices (John Torpey ed., 2003); Hayner, supra note 10; Elazar Barkan, The Guilt
of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (2000).
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that they did not personally commit abuses.33 Those directly connected to atrocities argue that
they relied on existing law, which told them that targeted abuses against a particular group were
necessary, or at least not illegal.34 While those in this group cannot claim that they did not do it,
they can displace responsibility to the state or protest that imposing liability would violate
prohibitions against enforcement of law ex post facto.35 Whether packaged as “I didn’t do it” or
“I didn’t do anything wrong,” the core objection is the same.36
This focus on guilt and innocence is evidence of a legalistic bias in transitional justice
debates generally,37 and conversations about reparations in particular.38 That bias is a
consequence of the common view that reparations constitute special tort awards justified by the
need to compensate for harm. This tort model implicates basic moral considerations and
33

Ogletree, supra note 22.

34

Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative
Action and Reparations, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 683, 711 (2004); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 15,
at 691; Gray, supra note 2, at 2631-36; Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 597, 616.

35

Keith Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1209, 1222 (2004); Forde-Mazrui, supra
note 34, at 711; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 15, at 691 (noting that reparations are typically
provided “on the basis of wrongs that were substantively permissible under the prevailing law
when committed”).

36

Alfred Brody, The Culture War Over Reparations for Slavery, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 1181, 120206 (2004); Brophy, supra note 16, at 121; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 15, at 703-04;
Tracinski, supra note 23, at 151-55. There are many other objections that can be made. For
example, both victims and contributors might object if the beneficiary class includes nonvictims or if the nature and degree of benefits does not reflect variations in harms suffered. For
present, however, this Article will focus two of the most significant objections, thought the
theory developed here does provide grounds for responding to many other challenges.

37

McEvoy, supra note 5, at 16; see also Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism:
Violence, Norms, and the ‘Rule of Law’”, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2275 (2003) (criticizing the fetish
for “the rule of law” in transitional justice and foreign policy debates).

38

Pablo De Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in The Handbook of Reparations, supra note 14, at
451-53; Vandeginste, supra note 14, at 145.
10
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fundamental notions of fairness.39 One should not be held to account for harm caused by
another; and one should not be blamed for doing what was lawful at the time.40 For the purpose
of assigning criminal liability, the constraints entailed by faith to individualism are hard to
contest. Indeed, with a few exceptions, criminal punishment cannot be imposed in transitions
without compromising the legality principle, which also has its roots in ethical individualism.41
However, it is not at all clear that such faith is salient to reparations debates. To the contrary, a
more careful accounting of the role reparations can and should play in the process of transition
reveals that the personal affront implied by a normative individualism applies only if reparations
are treated as a tool of ordinary justice. The more promising alternative suggested here is to take
seriously the unique practical and normative conditions that define transitions.42
In addition to cash compensation, the reparations literature recognizes a broad diversity
of material reparations, including access guarantees.43 The literature also recognizes a host of
more “symbolic” measures, including apologies (whether private or public, personal or official),
days of remembrance, and monuments.44 One might regard these sorts of efforts as

39

See Brophy, supra note 16, at 135-36 (advocating for a reparations model focusing on
assignments of moral culpability).

40

Brody, supra note 36, at 1202.

41

See generally, Gray, supra note 2.

42

As is argued in Part VII, the theory developed here encompasses a range of transitions,
including some that are lingering and slow-moving.

43

Vandeginste, supra note 14, at 146-47.

44

Id; see Con. Res. 26, 11th Cong. (2009) (apologizing for slavery and Jim Crow); Civil
Liberties Act of 1998, 50 U.S.C. § 1989 (2000) (“apologiz[ing] on behalf of the people of the
United States” for the “internment of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens of
Japanese ancestry during World War II); De Greiff, supra note 38, at 452-53; Sherrilyn Ifill,
11
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“compensatory” in a broad sense. However they are much more than that. In particular, they
reflect a significant but little understood fact about transitions: while even stable states45
constantly undergo change, transitions present a uniquely liminal moment for societies “betwixt
and between”46 an abusive past and a future peace guarded and preserved by commitments to
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.47 Recognizing the liminal status of transitions
provides valuable context for understanding and organizing the elements of a hybrid approach to
transitional justice, including reparations. In particular, it focuses attention on the need in
transitions to face the future as well as the past in an effort to recognize and, by affirmative steps,
correct, reform, and reshape the social paradigms implicated in past abuses.48 This transitional

On the Courthouse Lawn: Confronting the Legacy of Lynching in the Twenty-First Century
126, 128-31 (2007); Ruth Rubio-Marin & Pablo De Greiff, Women and Reparations, 1 Int’l J.
of Transitional Just. 318, 330-32 (2007); Ernesto Verdeja, A Normative Theory of Reparations
in Transitional Democracies, in Genocide’s Aftermath, supra note 15, 166, 171-78;
Yamamoto, et al., supra note 16, at 35-37; Martha Minow, Memory and Hate, in Breaking the
Cycles of Violence: Memory, Law, and Repair, 14, 23 (Martha Minow, ed. 2002); Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 15, at 725-36; Magarrell, supra note 17, at 89-90; Brooks, supra note 22,
at 268-72 (discussing various forms of reparation and redress).
45

In this Article, I use terms such as “stable state” and “abusive regime,” implying that they refer
to clear categories. They do not. In fact, most states fall on a spectrum. Locutions reflecting
that awareness are quite cumbersome, however, so rather than include a caveat every time, the
reader should assume that use of these stark phrases implies a certain irony.

46

Victor Turner, Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual 93 (1967).

47

See also Anna Simons, Somalia and the Dissolution of the Nation State, 96 Am.
Anthropologist 818, 822 (1994). For a useful definition of “the rule of law,” see Kaimipono
David Wenger, Reparations With the Rule of Law, 29 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 231, 231-32 (2006)
(defining “the rule of law” as “the idea that laws are equally applied, knowable, and distinct
from arbitrary power.”). Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks provides a thought-provoking discussion of
foreign policy surrounding the rule of law in her The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and
the “Rule of Law”, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2275 (2003).

48

Vandeginste, supra note 14, at 148.
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imperative requires an approach to justice that accounts for the source and nature of past abuses
and the challenges and goals of a transitional moment. Where ordinary justice is retrospective,
profane, and preservative, transitional justice as extraordinary justice can meet this challenge
because it is Janus-faced, liminal, and transformative.
To make the full case for transitional justice as extraordinary justice requires more than
can be accomplished here. This Article therefore uses reparations as an exemplar. Part II briefly
examines two of the most prominent not-quite-ordinary justice theories deployed to defend
reparations: collective responsibility and atonement. While the instinct behind these efforts is
laudable, the discussion reveals significant reasons to be skeptical. Part III argues that any
theory of transitional justice must take normative account of the role played by social paradigms
in structuring and justifying pre-transitional abuses. Part IV provides a novel account of mass
violence based on the loss of “dynamic stability.” Parts V and VI describe a transformational
role for reparations during the liminal process of transition. Part VII concludes.

II.

Two Not-Quite-Ordinary Theories of Justice

Objections to reparations programs get traction from what Pablo De Greiff calls a
juridical bias—a propensity to treat pre-transitional abuses as ordinary torts or crimes.49 That
ordinary justice leaning is evident in the view that reparations constitute special tort awards.
Most objections to reparations programs make this same assumption, treating reparations as
creatures of ordinary justice. Those asked to pay claim innocence.50 Recipients complain that
49

De Greiff, supra note 38, at 451-53.

50

Brody, supra note 36, at 1202.
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awards are inadequate.51 Those who claim harm but do not receive awards argue that reparations
programs “pick winners.”52 In the face of these objections, reparations proponents have floated
some alternative approaches to transitional justice. Prominent among these are theories of
collective responsibility53 and those based on atonement and reconciliation.54 In their current
forms, these approaches are not sufficient to support reparations programs. These failures are
due in part to conceptual difficulties. More damning, however, are the failures of these theories
to take seriously the unique features of pre-transitional abuses and the distinctive circumstances
faced by transitions.

51

See, e.g., Seymour J. Rubin, The Washington Accord Fifty Years Later: Neutrality, Morality,
and International Law, 14 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 61, 72-73 (1998) (explaining that German
reparations under the Washington Accord was of an amount “generally conceded to be grossly
inadequate”).

52

Lisa Laplante, The Law of Remedies and the Clean Hands Doctrine: Exclusionary Reparation
Policies in Peru’s Political Transition, 23 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 51, 52-53 (2007); Christopher
Colvin, Overview of the Reparations Program in South Africa, in The Handbook of
Reparations, supra note 14, at 201-02; Balfour, supra note 22, at 797.

53

See, e.g., Jaspers, supra note 31, at 25; Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person,
in Collective Responsibility 133 (May & Hoffman, eds., 1991); McCarthy, supra note 22, at
756-58; Miller, supra note 22, at 72; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 34, at 694-726 (“the case for
holding American society responsible for past discrimination depends on the plausibility of
recognizing American society as a collective and continuing nation, the obligations for which
fairly pass through time and generations.”); George Fletcher, Liberals and Romantics at War:
The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 Yale L.J. 1499 (2002); Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility
and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 959 (1992); Heinrich Gomperz, Individual,
Collective and Social Responsibility, 49 Ethics 329, 33 (1939).

54

See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks, The Age of Apology, in When Sorry Isn’t Enough: The Controversy
Over Apologies and Reparations 3 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999).
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A.

Collective Responsibility

The instinct behind collective responsibility is straightforward: Horrific acts of targeted
violence are perpetrated in abusive regimes. Those acts are widespread, implicating thousands
of individuals and diffusing responsibility.55 Abuses also are institutionalized and backed by
publicly endorsed legal and social norms. It therefore makes sense to hold responsible the group
as a whole because abuses reflected collective will.56 If the group uses state authority to
perpetrate abuses, then it likewise makes sense to hold the state liable for resulting harms.57
Shifting from individual to collective responsibility has a number of salutary effects. First, it
limits claims for reparation to the group or the state, clarifying whence funds can come. Second,
because individuals are not held personally liable, defenses based on ethical individualism
appear to melt away.58
While attractive at first glance, collective responsibility theories face serious practical and
conceptual problems that make them unattractive as potential sources of support for reparations
in transitions. Foremost among these is the simple fact that groups do not act; only individuals

55

Plato, Apology 32c-d (reporting efforts by Thirty Tyrants to diffuse guilt by ordering Athenian
citizens to participate in atrocities); Gray, supra note 2, at 2624-25; Brooks, supra note 22, at
276.

56

Brooks, supra note 22, at 276.

57

McCarthy, supra note 22, at 762.

58

See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and Slavery: On Incomplete Commodification,
Intergenerational Justice, and Legal Transitions, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1139 (2004); Forde-Mazrui,
supra note 34, at 694-710; Bernard Boxill, Morality of Reparation, 2 J. Soc. Theory & Prac.
113, 120 (1972); see also Ryan Fortson, Collective Liability, the Limited Prospects of Success
for a Class Action Suit for Slavery Reparations, and the Reconceptualization of White Racial
Identity, 6 Afr.-Am. L. & Pol’y Rep. 71, 80 (2004).
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act.59 This has two consequences. First, it may not always be clear that an individual’s conduct
can be attributed to a group. Internal decision structures may allow such attribution,60
particularly in the case of corporations, but that case is harder to make for states and impossible
in the case of ethnic or religious groups.61 Second, there is always a diversity of relationships
between group members and abuses. Some are abusers while others actively work to prevent
atrocities, often at great personal peril.62 These consequences reveal a distribution problem,
which theories of collective responsibility cannot resolve. Just because the conduct of some
individuals may rightly be attributed to a corporation or group does not mean that the
consequences for that conduct can rightly fall upon all members in the form of obligations to
contribute to reparations programs. Advocates might respond that such disparities are of no
consequence in light of failures by the group and its individual members to protect oppressed
populations63 or the fact that each individual member of a group allows the group to persist.64
However, that requires reliance on a theory of liability by omission—no small feat—and ignores

59

George Fletcher, Collective Guilt and Collective Punishment, 5 Theoretical Inq. in L. 163
(2004); H.D. Lewis, Collective Responsibility (A Critique), in Collective Responsibility, supra
note 46, at 17, 20; Miguel Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Responsible, in Collective
Responsibility, supra note 46, at 111, 124; Jaspers supra note 31, at 33-36.

60

See, e.g., French, supra note 53, at 133.

61

Jaspers supra note 31, at 33-36.

62

Boraine, supra note 31, at 39-168 (recounting the risks he and other white and black leaders
ran in helping to end Apartheid in South Africa).

63

Forde-Mazrui, supra note 34, at 722.

64

Sepinwall, supra note 22, at 213-15.
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the fact that some group members were heroes while others were demons.65 Collectivizing guilt
also has the odd effect of diffusing responsibility into nonexistence. After all, “if everyone is
guilty then no one is.”66
Because groups can only act through individuals, collective responsibility also raises
mens rea problems. This presents one of two options for collective responsibility advocates.
First, they can assume that each agent’s acts reflect his individual mental state. However, to do
so would open the door to objections based on ethical individualism. Alternatively, advocates
can paint a picture of individual agents’ manifesting collective consciousness just as our limbs
manifest our own wills. However, such a view is hard to square with subjective experience and
closely held commitments to freewill.67
Even were one to accept a thick account of collective will, however, there remains the
problem of mistake.68 Atrocities on a scale warranting transitional justice rely on a belief that
victims are rightly the objects of abuse, often because victims are regarded as less than human69
or as posing an imminent threat.70 To hold a group responsible for abuses perpetrated under the

65

Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 613-14n. 143; Prosecutor v. Nikolić, IT-02-60/1-S, 60
(Dec. 2, 2003).

66

Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 599.

67

See, e.g., Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 Proc. British Acad. 1 (1962) (arguing
that our conceptions of freewill should respect and reflect common “reactive attitudes”).

68

I am in debt to Ronald Dworkin for conversations on this point.

69

McCarthy, supra note 22, at 623, 631-32.

70

See infra Part III; Gray, supra note 2, at 2629-42.
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influence of such false beliefs requires holding that group liable for the beliefs themselves.71
That, in turn, requires identifying a moment in the historical genesis of those beliefs when it can
rightly be said that the group as a whole acted willfully, knowingly, or at least recklessly in
allowing itself to pursue an epistemic path to atrocities.72 That is a hard story to tell about a
group because, again, groups cannot act. Consequently, any history of a group’s consciousness
will turn on the conduct of individuals over the course of years, decades, centuries, and millennia
leaving no post to which claims of liability for reparations can be tethered.
Amy Sepinwall and Thomas McCarthy advance a potential response.73 They argue that
groups can maintain continuous identity over time74 and that those who associate with a group
must assume responsibility for the group’s past wrongs both because of that association and
because their association allows the group to persist.75 This approach to collective responsibility
also fails to satisfy. First, transitional regimes are defined in opposition to abuses perpetrated by
their forebears.76 It is therefore hard to make the case that transitional and post-transitional

71

Gideon Rosen, Skepticism About Moral Responsibility, 18 Philosophical Perspectives 295
(2004) (arguing that wrongs reflective of moral mistakes are blameless unless the moral
mistake is itself culpable).

72

Id at 71.

73

See, e.g., Sepinwall, supra note 22, at 205-09; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 34, at 717-18;
McCarthy, supra note 22 at 757-58.

74

Sepinwall, supra note 22, at 203.

75

Id. at 205-09; McCarthy, supra note 22, at 757-58. See also, Bernard Boxill, A Lockean
Argument for Black Reparations, 7 J. Ethics 63 (2003).

76

Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice, 28-33 (2002).
18

Extraordinary Justice

regimes are the same “person” as the prior regime.77 Second, the most common targets for
collective responsibility are states, racial groups, or ethnic groups.78 For most members of these
groups, membership is a matter of existential luck.79 The moment of voluntary association
assumed in McCarthy and Sepinwall’s approach to collective responsibility is therefore fiction at
best. Moreover, exit from one’s racial or ethnic group is impossible and exit from one’s state of
birth practically so for most people, rendering any claim of implied consent implausible.80 Most
troubling, however, is that this view of group responsibility endorses a brand of intergenerational
responsibility that is of a kind with the group consciousness implicated in blood feuds81 and
many examples of mass atrocity.82 Transitional justice advocates should take pause before

77

For an argument in favor of holding successor regimes liable for the debts incurred by their
forbears see David Gray, Devilry, Complicity, and Greed: Transitional Justice and Odious
Debt, 70 L. & Contemp. Probs. 137, 147-57 (2007).

78

See, e.g., Sepinwall, supra note 22, at 209.

79

Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law 197-98 (2007).

80

For a useful overview of implied consent and exit, see Linda Barclay, Liberalism and
Diversity, in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy 155 (Jackson & Smith, eds.,
2005).

81

For discussions of the roles played by blood feuds in recent cases of mass atrocity, see
Margaret Hasluck, The Albanian Blood Feud, in Law and Warfare: Studies in the
Anthropology of Conflict 381 (Paul Bohannan ed., 1967); Richard Oakes, The Albanian Blood
Feud, 6 J. Int’l L. & Prac. 177 (1997). As Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks notes, the norms governing
blood feuds do provide “order.” Supra note 47, at 2309. However, it is not exactly the kind of
order one would wish for a post-transitional society.

82

Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust 27163, 416-54 (1996); Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be
Killed with Our Families: Stories From Rwanda 47-62, 96-131 (1998); Richard Rorty, Human
Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in On Human Rights 111, 112-15 (Shute & Hurley
eds., 1993).
19

Extraordinary Justice

embracing the cognitive and moral structures at the heart of what Samantha Power has called the
“Problem from Hell.”83
B.

Atonement and Reconciliation

Atonement theories focus on achieving reconciliation between former abusers and
victims.84 Apologies, composed of a “(1) confess[ion] of the deed, (2)admi[ssion] that the deed
constitutes an atrocity, (3) repent[ance], and (4) ask[ing] for forgiveness,”85 are central.86 As
symbolic reparations, apologies reflect “remorse,” “taking of personal responsibility,” and a
sincere effort at reconciliation.87 Material reparations on the atonement view constitute a
“tangible . . . redemptive act . . . [that makes] the apology believable.”88
While emotionally compelling, atonement theories commit advocates to conceptual
constraints that render the entire approach practically naïve and potentially oppressive. First,
apologies rest on regret, what Karl Jaspers calls “moral guilt,” which can only be assessed

83

Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide 1-16 (2002).

84

See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 22, at 6-7; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and
Dilemmas, 27 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 157, 159 (2004); Miller, Reconceiving
Reparations, supra note 22, at 71-79; Brooks, supra note 22, at 254, 273-79; Brooks, supra
note 29, at 63; Lewis Beale, Seeking Justice for Slavery’s Sins, L.A. Times, April 22, 2002, pt.
5 at 1 (quoting Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, plaintiff in In re African-American Slave
Descendents Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir. 2006)).

85

Brooks, supra note 29, at 667.

86

Id. at 66-67.

87

Id. at 67; see also Anthony Sebok, Two Concepts of Injustice in Restitution for Slavery, 84
B.U.L. Rev. 1405, 1424-27 (2004).

88

Brooks, supra note 29, at 67.
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internally.89 That is, as compared to legal liability, which is imposed by external authority,90 the
guilt that gives rise to apology is wholly a function of subjective acceptance of responsibility.91
Apologies therefore cannot be enforced, but must reflect a spontaneous and genuine acceptance
of responsibility.92 This subjective constraint is not disputed by atonement theorists.93 To the
contrary, it is an essential feature of their theory.94 However, because apology and atonement are
tied to spontaneous subjective mental, ethical, and moral states,95 there can be no procedural
guarantees of success.96 Abusers may simply refuse to apologize because they regard themselves
as innocent or justified,97 or perhaps because they are afraid that apology implies a duty to pay
reparations—which, according to atonement advocates, it does98—or that it will threaten the

89

Jaspers, supra note 31, at 25-26.

90

Id. at 25.

91

Id.

92

Brooks, supra note 29, at 64; Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms vs. Righting Wrongs: The
Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1659, 1677 (1992).

93

Brooks, supra note 29, at 67.

94

See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 29, at 66-67; Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical
Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323, 390 (1987); see also
Hampton, supra note 92, at 1677; Fortson, supra note 58 at 123; Strawson, supra note 67, at
191 (noting that “to forgive is to accept the repudiation and to forswear the resentment [of a
wrong done]”).

95

Hampton, supra note 92, at 1677; Strawson, supra note 67, at 191.

96

Minow, supra note 17 at 18-20.

97

See, Ifill, supra note 44, at 17, 64-66; Gray, supra note 2, at 2629-36.

98

Brooks, supra note 29, at 67.
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world view upon which their identities and moral sense depend.99 Where this occurs, atonement
theories have no way to proceed. Any enforcement mechanism, whether as carrot or stick, just
taints the apology and undercuts any hope for true atonement.100
More compelling than these practical concerns is the potential that atonement processes
will oppress former victims. Atonement is a reciprocal relationship between abuser and
victim.101 To succeed, atonement requires not only a sincere apology,102 but also acceptance of
that apology and forgiveness by the victim.103 Also like apology, forgiveness is spontaneous.104
There are no necessary or sufficient conditions.105 Perhaps out of concern for success, atonement
theorists ignore this central feature of forgiveness and claim that genuine apology coupled with a
substantial offer of reparation imposes upon victims a “civic responsibility to forgive.”106 This

99

See Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 47, at 2305.

100

Roy Brooks, for one, admits this limitation. See Brooks, supra note 29, at 667.

101

Brooks, supra note 22, at 255.

102

Id. at 256.

103

Brooks, supra note 29, at 67 (“forgiveness is an essential component of the atonement
model’s ultimate goal of reconciliation”); Brooks, supra note 22, at 255.

104

Minow, supra note 17, at 20.

105

Boraine, supra note 31, at 213-14; Minow, supra note 44, at 18; Panu Minkkinen,
Ressentiment as Suffering: On Transitional Justice and the Impossibility of Forgiveness, 19
Cardozo Stud. L. & Lit. 513, 515 (2007).

106

Brooks, supra note 29, at 68.
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view is not only incoherent, it is oppressive; it denies the dignity of victims, and constitutes a
perpetuation of abuse.107
There is much more to be said about atonement,108 but this brief discussion is sufficient to
raise credible concerns that cases for reparation based on atonement are incoherent, oppressive,
or facile. Such demands simply do not comport with the moral foundations of apology and
forgiveness. To ignore that incoherence is to engage in a new round of abuse. Alternatively, to
respect those limitations and simply hope that abusers will apologize and victims forgive puts
reparation programs on uncertain foundations. Atonement should of course be encouraged and
celebrated where it occurs, but it cannot be mandated109 and, as a theory, cannot carry the
normative and practical burdens of organizing transitional justice programs generally or
justifying reparations programs in particular.

III.

Extraordinary Injustice
“Man’s inhumanity to man makes countless thousands mourn.”
—Robert Burns110

107

See Richard Weisman, Showing Remorse at the TRC: Towards a Constitutive Approach to
Reparative Discourse, 24 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 221 (2006) (highlighting the importance
of non-oppressive dialogue in the success of atonement and social reconstruction).

108

For a more extensive discussion of collective responsibility, atonement, and other not-quiteordinary claims for reparation in transition see, David Gray, A No-Excuse Approach to
Transitional Justice, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2010).

109

Minow, supra note 44, at 18; Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 623.

110

Robert Burns, Man Was Made to Mourn, in The Poetical Works of Robert Burns 203 (James
T. Currie ed., 2009).
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Many prominent contributors to the transitional justice literature misunderstand the
challenges in transitions and therefore miss significant theoretical and practical opportunities
because they view transitional justice as “ordinary justice.”111 In particular, they fail to take
normative account of both the “justice gap”112—the radical disparity between justice needs and
resources available to transitional regimes seeking some form of justice—and the underlying
cause of that gap—the complex of cultural norms, social practices, institutional regimes, black
letter law, official policies, institutional practices, social norms, cultural ideology, and historical
teleology that together provide the organizing ontology and justificatory ethic of abusive regimes
and which ratify, induce, and sustain programs of mass violence.113 This same short-sightedness
is manifest in reparations debates. Here, the mistake is to treat reparations as gap-filling
measures, meant to provide compensation114 and partial vindication for retributive impulses
residual of an ordinary justice mentality.115 Reparations programs certainly must take account of
the past; and there is no doubt that transitional justice debates are driven by the fact of past
atrocities. However, in the transitional context taking account of the past means much more than
documenting wrongdoing and measuring harm; it means recognizing past wrongs as oppositional

111

See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 18.

112

Bell & O’Rourke, supra note 13, at 35; Gray, supra note 2, at 2624-29.

113

Gray, supra note 2, at 2629-36.

114

Brooks, supra note 22, at 284-87.

115

Posner & Vermeule, supra note 15, at 691; Brooks, supra note 22, at 284-87; Emma Coleman
Jordan, The Non-Monetary Value of Reparations Rhetoric, 6 Afr. Am. L. & Pol’y Rep. 21, 25
(2004); Dinah Shelton, Right Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility, 96
A.J.I.L. 833, 844 (2002).
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markers for future conduct and policy. This call implies as a first step examining the underlying
sources of mass atrocity. That is the program in this Part and the next.
A.

Power, Paradigms, and Truth Regimes

“Every human being is fated to be enmeshed in the power relations he lives by.”
—Karl Jaspers116
Although selective prosecutions habitually focus on those “most responsible,”117 the
grueling labor of atrocities are carried out by cadres of “willing executioners”118 with the
knowledge, support, and assistance of public personalities, such as the military, police, political
leaders, and members of the media.119 These diverse agents of destruction are not independent
entrepreneurs. Rather, their activities are organized and rationalized by black letter law,120
institutional practice,121 official policy,122 and cultural norms, including a social ontology and
historical teleology that sustains in abusers a sense of justification for their conduct123 by
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Jaspers, supra note 31, at 28.

117

Sorpong Peou, Human Security in East Asia: Challenges for Collaborative Action 112 (2008);
Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 579; Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive
Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 355 (2002).

118

Goldhagen, supra note 82; Prosecutor v. Banovic, IT-02-65/1-5, 108 (Sept. 3, 2003).
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Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T. Judgment and Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003).
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Wenger, supra note 47, at 232.
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Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 576.
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Harris, supra note 17, at 1777.
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Brooks, supra note 22, at 276 (noting that government approval is a necessary contributor to
mass atrocities).
25

Extraordinary Justice

presenting a view of the world in which victims are sub-human124 and by advancing a vision of
the end of history in which the victims have been eliminated from society or existence.125
The ability of background social norms and institutional practice to produce willing
agents is well documented.126 It is at the center of Hannah Arendt’s famous account of the
“banality of evil,”127 the ability of public expectations and bureaucratic structures to turn normal
people into agents of destruction.128 Her journalistic account is consistent with the work of
politically sophisticated ethnographers like Victor Turner, who have documented the various
uses of “consensual power,” as contrasted with “coercive” power.129 Coercive power achieves
its goals solely by the threat of force. In terms familiar to classic utilitarians and modern law and
economics scholars, coercive power imagines its objects in the most cynical terms as behavior
124

Rorty, supra note 82; Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 47, at 2327, 2332.

125

Goldhagen, supra note 82, at 21; Gourevitch, supra note 82, at 96, 115; Miriam J. Aukerman,
Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice, 15
Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 39, 59 (2002).

126

See, e.g., Frank Chalk & Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide (1990);
Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 606-20; Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 47, at 2327,
2331;.

127

Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963) (describing
how ordinary Germans joined and contributed to the Holocaust out of banal commitments to
professionalism, bureaucratic role, and public duty).

128

Daniel Goldhagen makes a similar argument in Hitler’s Willing Executioners, though there
focuses on the power of an eliminationist anti-Semitism in the production of Nazi abuses.
Arendt, by contrast, is demonstrably struck by the fact that Eichmann apparently harbored no
strong feelings of anti-Semitism and was driven by, at most, career aspirations and a sense of
professional duty.
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Marc J. Swartz, et al., Introduction, in Political Anthropology, 14 (Marc J. Swartz , et al., eds.
1966). “Power” is, of course, a loaded word. Swartz et al. seem to agree with Foucault in the
proposition that “power” is nothing more than the achievement of effects in the world through
relationships. See Foucault, Ethic of Care, supra note 135, at 11.
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machines adopting courses of conduct according to personal calculations of risk and reward.130
Consensual power operates quite differently. In contrast to coercive power, consensual power
“is a symbolic medium”131 that encourages its subjects to identify with a view of the world, an
ideology, and a certain way of doing things. It seeks to connect its subjects’ senses of
themselves to the production and maintenance of social states of affairs.132 Consensual power
conceives of its subjects not as objects for blunt manipulation by threat of force, but as a medium
that can be shaped and formed into willing instruments.133 Consensual power produces effects
from within rather than from without. As compared to coercive power, consensual power
pursues spontaneous conformance by willing subjects who are personally invested in the
production and maintenance of a society and world in which those agents find fulfillment and
meaning.134
In both his concrete archaeologies and his more elusive theoretical work, Michel
Foucault describes a similar conception of power. Foucault famously argued that power is not
potential, but the demonstrated production of effects in the world through relationships.135 In his
view, power’s most significant preoccupation is with the production of subjects within “regimes
130

See Economist, Aug. 8, 2009, at 71; Ernesto Verdeja, A Critical Theory of Reparative Justice,
15 Constellations 208, 210 (2008); Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 47, at 2321.

131

Swartz, et al., supra note 129, at 14.
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Id. at 14-17; see also Harris, supra note 17, at 1742-77.

133

Swartz, et al., supra note 129, at 10.

134

Id. at 15.
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Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction Vol. I, 94 (1990); Michel
Foucault, The Ethic and Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom, in Final Foucault, 1, 11
(Bernauer and Rasmussen, eds. 1987).
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of truth.”136 Regimes of truth are, straightforwardly, circular relationships among “Truth”—
conceived as “systems of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution,
circulation and operation of statements,”—“systems of power”—“which produce and sustain
[Truth],”—and “effects of power”—“which [Truth] induces and which extend [Truth].”137 That
is, Truth and power enjoy a necessary relationship through public institutions and practices
where Truth is elaborated and established by the production of phenomena, including subjects,
which in turn reinforce and sometimes alter the norms of inclusion and exclusion, right and
wrong, good and bad, that constitute and reflect Truth. In short, “Truth [as] a thing of the world .
. . induces regular effects of power.”138
Foucault spent his career tracing the history of various truth regimes. His archaeologies
documented the interactions between normative systems and institutions in the creation of
subjects.139 Most intriguing for present purposes is his suggestion that “[e]ach society has its
regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth.”140 That is, societies, by definition and as a matter
of self-definition, are constantly engaged at all levels in the process of establishing, developing,
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Michel Foucault, Truth and Power, in Power/Knowledge 109, 133 (1980).
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Id. at 133.
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Id. at 131.
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See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of
Reason (1988); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1995);
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, supra note 135; Michel Foucault, 2 The History of
Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure (1990); Michel Foucault, 3 The History of Sexuality: The Care
of the Self (1988).
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and using institutions to sort truth claims, create norms, histories, teleologies, and social
ideologies that regulate, order, and thereby create subjects.141
The concept of a truth regime can be found in slightly less abstract form in the
anthropology literature as the concept of “paradigms.” In terms similar to Foucault’s, Victor
Turner defines “paradigms” as “sets of ‘rules’ from which many kinds of sequences of social
action may be generated but which further specify what sequences must be excluded.”142
Political paradigms are particularly salient to the current discussion because they draw and
maintain the boundaries of society and designate the roles and positions of individuals within
society.143 Further, as the rules governing acceptable conduct and social identities, paradigms
are both the subject and the object of social action; they generate their own subjects, but also
enter into contest with competing paradigms.144
While essays and books can and have been written on these powerful conceptual tools,
for now all that need be pointed out is that political societies feature internal identity norms that
are developed, established, and extended through public and private institutions, practices,
rituals, and patterns of behavior. These norms are fundamental to society and its members,
serving as markers of inclusion, exclusion, and therefore identity.145 While community identity
141

Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, The Role of Community in Participatory Transitional
Justice, in Transitional Justice from Below, supra note 5, at 99¸ 109 (noting transitional justice
goal of “‘gain[ing] a place at the knowledge creating table’”).
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Turner, supra note 142, at 17.
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Jaspers, supra note 31, at 28-29. Husserl adopts a similar view in his account of “lifeworlds.”
See Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences 108-09, 133 (1970).
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is in one sense “imagined,”146 it is very real for society and its members. Richard Rorty’s being
the exception;147 there is seldom much irony in identity claims. For most people, the truths of
inclusion and exclusion are fundamental to public and private identity.148 This is the stuff of
basic dignity and the fount of subjective and inter-subjective accountings of worth and
worthiness. Even in contested fields, basic disciplinary norms operate inter-subjectively as
standards for sorting and evaluating truth claims constitutive of who we are.
Bound up with social identity are conceptions of relative ontological position and
teleological entitlement endorsed by historical narratives. Whether regarded as a truth regime or
a social paradigm, the phenomenological output of the complex engagement of these ideological
commitments and the social practices and public institutions with which they enjoy reciprocal
relationships is the same: the construction of subjects who internalize core values, act in ways
that reflect and extend dominant social ideologies, and pursue a transcendent view of the end of
history. I do not want to be misunderstood as claiming that projects of consensual power, truth
regimes, or paradigms in societies and states are unitary or static. To the contrary, they are
extremely dynamic. As is argued in the next sections, that very dynamism is central to the
production of mass atrocities.
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Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (1991); Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 47, at 2316.
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B.

The Role of Abusive Paradigms in Pre-Transitional Abuses

“The Devil is in the absence of doubt. He’s what pushes people into suicide
bombing, into setting up extermination camps. Doubt may give your dinner a
funny taste, but it’s faith that goes out and kills.”
—John Updike149
In abusive regimes the dominant paradigm, often backed by black letter law,150 demands
or at least tolerates targeted abuse against an identified group.151 While as varied as the capacity
for creative evil so characteristically human,152 these paradigms share a few salient features.
First, they tend to reduce society to two groups.153 Second, following this “bi-polar logic,”154 an
abusive paradigm characterizes those in the targeted class as sub-human155 and naturally
subservient156 or at least not people “like us” deserving of treatment as equals.157 Third, those
149

John Updike, Roger’s Version 81 (1986).

150

Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 47, at 2307.

151

See Goldhagen, supra note 82, at 27-163, 416-54; Gourevitch, supra note 82, at 47- 62, 96131; Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned 33-64 (2000); Jaime
Malamud-Goti, Game Without End: State Terror and the Politics of Justice, 29-99 (1996);
Carlos Nino, Radical Evil on Trial 41-60 (1996); Power, supra note 83, at 1-16; Rorty, supra
note 82, at 112-15.

152

See Brooks, The Age of Apology, in When Sorry Isn’t Enough supra note 22, at 4 (“[A]ll
societies have the capacity to do evil. No society holds a monopoly on the commission of
human injustices, nor is any society exempted. To Max Frankel’s question—‘Is there a beast
in each of us waiting to be unleashed by extraordinary fear, greed or fury?’—I would have to
answer, yes.”)
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Malamud-Goti, supra note 151, at 29-99; see also Boraine, supra note 31, at 104, 110-12;
Elster, Closing the Books, supra note 3, at 93.
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Malamud-Goti, supra note 151, at 29-99.
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Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 47, at 2327; Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 609.
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Brooks, supra note 22, at 267; Rorty, supra note 82, at 112-15.
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targeted for abuse are regarded as a persistent and emergent threat against the survival of the
dominant group and its ability to achieve its rightful place at the end of history.158 Abusive
paradigms allow perpetrators to justify their conduct to themselves and others, often making
targeted violence a source of pride.159
The role of an abusive paradigm at the core of pre-transitional abuses is widely
recognized.160 For example, Roy Brooks points out that “atrocities can only occur when the
perpetrator fails to identify with [his] victims and fails to recognize a common humanity between
[himself] and the victims.”161 Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein reach a similar conclusion,
relying on social psychology studies.162 In an essay on the Balkans, Richard Rorty notes that
those who participate in mass atrocities do not regard their victims as “fellow human beings,” but
as “animals” or “pseudohumans.”163 Daniel Goldhagen has argued that, perpetrators of atrocities
157

Fortson, supra note 58, at 77 (noting that “Whiteness is based principally on the oppression of
minority groups by defining them as Other.”).

158

Goldhagen, supra note 82, at 3-24, 49-50; Chalk & Jonasohn, supra note 126, at 29; Simon
Wiesenthal, The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness 15 (1997);
Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 47, at 2327; see also Swartz, et al., supra note 129, at 15
(attaching conformance to consensual power to the preservation of a desired social order).

159

Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 636.

160

Phillip Zizubando, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil 296
(2007); Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 47, at 2313, 2327; Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2,
at 581, 604-20; Roberta de la Roche Senechal, The Sociogenesis of Lynching, in Under
Sentence of Death: Essays on Lynching in the South (W. Fitzhugh Brandage, ed., 1997);
Roberta de la Roche Senechal, Collective Violence as Social Control, 11 Soc. F. 97, 106
(1996).
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Brooks, Getting Reparations Right, supra note 22, at 267.
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Rorty, supra note 82, at 112.
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“th[ink] that their victims should die” and that they kill “out of conviction in the justice of their
actions.”164 Philip Gourevitch has described genocide as “an exercise in community
building.”165 W.E.B. Du Bois ties racial oppression to a bi-polar logic, highlighting the role of
inter-group fear in racial violence.166 Following his work, Sherrilyn Ifill has linked lynching in
the United States to a background racism that casts blacks as dangerous, prone to violence, and
lesser evolved.167
As John Rawls points out, transitional states are heirs to abusive paradigms and therefore
“burdened.”168 The paradigms that hold sway in pre-transitional regimes provide a view of the
world for abusers in which murder, rape, and assault targeted against members of a specific
group169 is at least not prohibited, if it is not a moral or historical imperative.170 That public
sanction often manifests subjectively as a sense of entitlement on the part of abusers.171 They are
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Goldhagen, supra note 82, at 14-15.
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Gourevitch, supra note 82, at 95.
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W.E.B. Du Bois, The Shape of Fear, in The Social Theory of W.E.B. Du Bois, 56 (Phil
Zuckerman, e.d., 2004).
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Ifill, supra note 44, at 17, 43-44, 64-66; see also Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 47, at 2327
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John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 5, 106 (1999).
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Roy Brooks, The Age of Apology, in When Sorry Isn’t Enough, supra note 22, at 3-11; Rorty,
supra note 82, at 112.
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Prosecutor v. Banovic, supra note 118, at 120-21.
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Goldhagen, supra note 82, at 14-15 (“Who doubts that the Argentine or Chilean
murderers of people who opposed the recent authoritarian regimes thought that their
victims deserved to die? Who doubts that the Tutsis who slaughtered Hutus in Burundi or
the Hutus who slaughtered Tutsis in Rwanda, that one Lebanese militia which slaughtered
the civilian supporters of another, that the Serbs who have killed Croats or Bosnian
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“willing executioners” because they are defending their view of the world and carrying out their
destiny as a people, group, or society.172 What makes transitional justice extraordinary is the
need to address an abusive paradigm in a constructive way. Thus, the justice gap is not merely a
material disparity between needs and resources, it is also a cognitive gap, reflecting the distance
between an abusive paradigm and the paradigm that must be achieved for the new state to
survive and vindicate its commitments to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Any
attempt to deal with the challenges of justice in transitions that ignores this defining feature will
always fail to satisfy.173 It also will pose significant risks for the success of transition by
ignoring the need for sustainable reform of public norms and institutions. Only by taking
normative account of the unique circumstances of pre-transitional abuses can practitioners and
theorists hope to develop a practically sustainable and theoretically sound transitional
jurisprudence. As the next Part argues, that path is best illuminated by a clear understanding of
the historical genesis of mass violence.

IV.

Mass Violence and the Collapse of Dynamic Stability

“There is no such thing as a people as whole. All lines that we may draw to define
it are crossed by facts. Language, nationality, culture, common fate—all this does
not coincide but is overlapping.”
—Karl Jaspers174
Muslims, did so out of conviction in the justice of their actions? Why do we not believe
the same for the German perpetrators?”).
172

Jaspers, supra note 31, at 28-29.
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Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 633.
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I do not mean to suggest that communities, states, and nations are homogeneous,
inhabited by only one paradigm, truth regime, or source of consensual power; quite to the
contrary. Most healthy political units are not limited to a single fundamental and ubiquitous line
or mode of association. Rather, all societies, and particularly stable states, are “segmented,”175
comprised of many smaller groups and associations, which stand in opposition to competing
groups and associations.176 These divisions frequently follow the bi-polar logic that drives
abusive paradigms. Yet, despite these divisions, stable regimes do not fragment and descend
into violent chaos in the way abusive regimes do. It is worth a moment to consider why. The
answer is surprising and, for present purposes, revelatory.
It is common and relatively intuitive to say that oppositions divide us. Be they economic,
racial, religious, cultural, or ethnic, be they fundamental or silly and petty, we all regard each as
“other” in some way. In recognition of these divisions, many leaders implore us to set aside our
differences and celebrate a universal essence that unites us in common above, beyond, and
despite our differences.177 That call is backed by some political scientists, who regard ethnic and
racial divisions as inherently destabilizing.178 While rhetorically seductive, such pursuits are not
only folly; they are dangerous and rely on “discredited ‘primordialist’ assumptions that ethnic

175
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Nuer, 147-48 (1940).
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(2005); Glucksman, supra note 175, at 1-2, 24.

177
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The E.N.D. (Interscope 2009).
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See Chandra, supra note 176, at 235-38 (describing this view and citing proponents).
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identities are fixed, unidimensional, and exogenous to politics.”179 Contrary to this view, ethnic
and other core existential identities are “fluid, multidimensional,” and responsive to public and
private events.180 Further, a robust multiplicity and variety of segmentary oppositions allows
societies to achieve and maintain stability.181 That stability is by nature and necessity dynamic
rather than static.182 Societies that incorporate this dynamism in their cultural, political, and
economic practices are supple and flexible in the face of internal and external challenges. It is by
virtue of this dynamic stability that most societies maintain a relative level of peace and
stability.183 By contrast, societies that reify a single thread of universal association and raise to
preeminence a particular line of association are terrifyingly brittle, unstable,184 and poised on the
precipice of disaster,185 awaiting only a trigger event to lead them into chaos.186 Behind calls to
unity lies the specter of a final solution.
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Chandra, supra note 176, at 236-38.

180

Id. See also Harris, supra note 17, at 1736-37(discussing the creation of “whiteness” in
response to economic and political factors).
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Boraine, supra note 31, at 104, 110-12 (describing how the violent threads of the black power
movement was occasioned, made necessary, and inspired by expressions of white power
through the Apartheid state ultimately “leading to serious conflict”); Harris, supra note 17, at
1768 (noting the racial oppression of “colorblindness”).
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An understanding and appreciation of the multiplicity of associations and oppositions that
intersect to form individual and collective identity is what marks the existential turn into
modernity.187 Post-modernity is defined by the view that this very diversity exposes the
contingency of any particular mode of identity.188 However, the ironic sensibility entailed by
this insight is far from dominant in the rarified world of academe, much less the hurly-burly of
public life in the modern nation-state where gender, religion, race, ethnicity, culture, class,
sexuality, and politics are central to public and private identity.189 For most people, these
identities carry real force, at times taking on a dominant role and echoing the bi-polar logic
characteristic of abusive paradigms.190 Yet, stability is maintained in most states. Mass
atrocities seldom occur, even in the face of the most suggestive and hate-filled speech, even
when emotions appear too hot to cool, and even when thinly-veiled rhetoric of violent hatred
rises to such a din we fear the cacophony will never abate.191
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Nancy Fraser, Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics, in Nancy Fraser & Axel Honneth,
Redistribution or Recognition 7, 55-56 (2003); Jessica Benjamin, Recognition and
Destruction: An Outline of Intersubjectivity, in Jessica Benjamin, Like Subjects, Love Objects:
Essays on Recognition and Sexual Difference (1995); Anthony Appiah, Multicultural
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1994).

188

Rorty, supra note 147.

189

See Jedediah Purdy, For Common Things: Irony, Trust, and Commitment in America Today
(1999).

190

Brody, supra note 36, at 1181.

191
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We need not, of course, cabin ourselves to political commentary on a grand scale to make
the point. In even the smallest groups there are competing paradigms that angle for dominance,
superiority, or entitlement. In any social or professional group, members indulge in the
construction of normatively significant ontologies.192 Who among us has not wondered who in
our families, social cohorts, offices, or faculties is the smartest, best looking, wealthiest, or most
popular? Likewise, we create and sustain narratives of entitlement—“Harry does not deserve
Sally’s affection;” “Suzy didn’t earn her wealth;” “I was really the best qualified for the
position.” We also foretell an end of history, a historical teleology, when the world will conform
to our idiosyncratic conceptions of right—“I might be down now, but when all the cards are
played, I’ll have the best job, the biggest house, and Sally’s love.” This is the stuff of society,
and a mainstay for literary endeavors sublime193 and primetime.194 However, petty slights and
minor intrigues aside, we kill each other only infrequently over such things. On a larger scale,
despite the fact that deep social and political oppositions are a given in modern states, with few
exceptions these divisions, no matter how deep and emotional, do not produce violence and
almost never descend into mass chaos. Despite our oppositions, we stay together; but why?
A.

Dynamic Stability as a Function of Conflict Multiplicity

“Herein lies social cohesion, rooted in the conflicts between men’s
different allegiances.”
192

Burt Useem, Breakdown Theories of Collective Action, 24 Ann. Rev. Soc. 215, 232 (1998);
Albert Bandura et al., Disinhibition of Aggression Through Diffusion of Responsibility and
Dehumanization of Victims, 9 J. Res. Personality 253, 254 (1975).
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—Max Glucksman195
In abusive regimes and stable states alike, groups survive by competing for the loyalty of
potential members and by marking their borders to exclude some and include others. The tools
and strategies deployed in these common games of inclusion and exclusion bear an eerie
similarity to the defining characteristics of abusive paradigms. Members look haughtily across
lines of division secure in their privilege and natural superiority, confident that they are destined
to prevail at the end of history. Stable states contain these divisions and oppositions, yet they
seldom if ever engage in genocide.196 “Why” may seem a riddle; but this Section and the next
argue that the answer is both transparent and profound: states maintain stability by preserving a
diversity of overlapping oppositions and associations.
There is no association without opposition.197 Inclusion by definition implies exclusion.
Abusive regimes decay into chaos not because society is fractured by lines of opposition, but
because a single opposition assumes dominance in the political field.198 The privilege entailed in
that rise allows the familiar normative, ontological, and teleological features of oppositional
logic to convert what otherwise might have been a peaceable disagreement into a paradigm of
abuse poised to lead cadres of willing executioners. By contrast, stable states remain stable not
because they eliminate all fissionary lines but because they maintain a broad diversity of
overlapping oppositions, each implying associations with some individuals and oppositions to
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Glucksman, supra note 175, at 4.
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others.199 In relatively peaceful states, this web of overlapping categories of inclusion and
exclusion is what restrains violence and maintains overall social cohesion and stability.200
In stable states, individuals have a more complex identity than their association with a
particular group might suggest. Pulling back a bit from the atomic level reveals that individuals
mark points of intersection between different groups, their social identities implicating multiple
dyads.201 The positions of individual group members at the intersections of various oppositions
imposes constraints on dyadic groups’ capacities to develop and sustain long-term opposition.202
These intersections also create lines of cohesion among groups with potentially conflicting
agendas.203 Paradoxically, then, social cohesion implies internal opposition.204
This dynamic cross-sectionality is highly visible in “primitive” societies.205 Take E. E.
Evans-Pritchard’s account of the Nuer.206 According to Evans-Pritchard, the central term of
199
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E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Nuer Religion (1956); E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Kinship and Marriage
Among the Nuer (1951) [hereinafter Evans-Pritchard, Kinship]; Evans-Pritchard, supra note
175. Evans-Pritchard, like many ethnographers of his generation, has been severely criticized
for his close relationship with colonialism. While damning, those criticisms endorse by
implication the validity of his account of dynamic social and political segmentation. His work
could not have been such a successful tool for colonial control if his descriptions of social
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group identity among the Nuer is agnatic, tracing patriarchal lineage and establishing duties of
defense and vengeance.207 However, these “feud” groups do not live in exclusive villages or
territories; rather, members are dispersed throughout a larger region and cohabitate with
members of other groups.208 As a result, agnatic identity cannot provide a source of cohesion for
everyone living in the same village. Instead, immediate interests of social proximity create lines
of association and interdependence binding members of competing agnates to one another along
lesser lines of association.209 Exogenous marriage rules, cleverly captured in the principle “they
are our enemies; we marry them,”210 create additional lines of association across agnate
groups.211 These are reinforced in daily domestic life and more persistently by duties of care and
rights of succor between children and maternal uncles.212 Add to these various other economic,
ritual, historic, and social associations, and a picture emerges of Nuer society as constructed of

segmentation and the dynamics of fission and fusion were not, in some straightforward
descriptive sense, “true.” That written, any reference to or use of his work cannot go forward
without recognizing the troubling role played by him and his peers in atrocities perpetrated by
colonial powers throughout the southern hemisphere.
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dynamic competing cross-associations.213 Even between sworn enemies, there exist
associational forces of cohesion that dramatically reduce or control violence.214
Societies composed and recomposed by dynamic cross-sectional associations are far
more stable than isolated groups or collections of unassociated individuals.215 Intra- and intergroup conflict is, of course, inevitable. In Evans-Pritchard’s terms, segmentary forces of fission
constantly arise, emphasizing particular lines of opposition and association.216 If individuals
existed in a one-dimensional social universe there would be no hope of limiting conflict or
constraining violence when fissures appeared. However, individuals who exist at the nexus of
numerous different lines of association inevitably find that self-interest is far more complex than
might appear in the face of an immediate fission within or between groups. Thus forces of
fusion drive members and groups together even as fissionary forces push them apart.217
This is a dynamic process. Different lines of association wax and wane, often in reaction
to the source and nature of a conflict or threat.218 Conflicts among nations drive inter-tribal
conflicts into the background.219 Clan rivalries are suffused in the face of inter-tribal conflict.
Associational identities may even be forgotten in the absence of an activating opposition.220
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However, in functional and stable societies, cross-sectional associations never disappear entirely.
It is by virtue of this dynamism that conflict, and, more importantly, violence inspired by any
particular opposition is controlled, regulated, and constrained.221 Stability is maintained by
offsetting vectors of association and opposition.222
The same dynamic cross-sectionality is evident in “advanced” societies as well.223 Social
cohesion in modern nation-states is achieved not by ensuring fundamental loyalty to one shared
norm, narrative, or institution. Rather, it is achieved through a complex interwoven web of
competing and overlapping loyalties and associations.224 The nation is stabilized by the
overlapping communities within its borders through intersecting lines of interest and allegiance
among members.225 The resulting picture is of an extensive system of overlapping circles. Each
of us occupies a unique space created by the intersecting spheres of the communities in which we
are members. Put differently, we are the residue of multiple claims of existential sufficiency,
with each of those claims implicating associates for whom the proposition also holds true. Some
Democrats are Presbyterians; some Presbyterians are investment bankers; some investment
221
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bankers are Republicans; and so forth. It is by virtue of these intersections that we maintain
relative social and political stability. Whenever a line of opposition is emphasized, pushing
society to segment, corollary lines of collateral association are activated, limiting the destructive
potential of the divisive force.226
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison engaged these issues in a debate over
factions.227 In Hamilton’s view, factions represented a tremendous threat to the stability of the
proposed union.228 His fear was that, liberated to pursue their own interests, people would form
insular groups and mobilize to pursue narrow agendas, thereby fragmenting and destabilizing the
body politic with deleterious consequences to the fragile new union.229 Madison was
sympathetic to these concerns, but disagreed with Hamilton’s assessment of the danger.
Madison recognized that the only way to prevent political factions’ forming was by tyrannical
means. As a natural consequence of freedom, people will develop and pursue their own
It is often claimed that the United States is fundamentally divided by between Democrats and
Republicans. While hyperbolic, that claim is not a complete fiction. Why, then, have we not
seen a genocidal confrontation between Democrats and Republicans? One possibility is shared
faith to a higher level of association. We are all Americans first, and Democrats or
Republicans second. That hypothesis is hard to maintain given that the contest between
Democrats and Republicans is frequently cast as a battle over what America is or ought to be
and who the “real” Americans are. The better description is that ours is a society divided by
more and more varied oppositions and associations than is captured by the narrative of Red vs.
Blue. To name just a few, we are divided by race, religion, economic status, education, alma
mater, beer preferences, etc. We stay together not despite these differences but because of
them. Each opposition implies a reciprocal and complementary association. That association
implicates others, some of which are populated by members of other groups with which we are
associated, and some of which are not.
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conceptions of the good life, forming associations with those who share their interests and
goals.230 But Madison did not see the demise of the union in this exercise of freedom. To the
contrary, he argued that the union was more likely to survive and thrive if, to borrow a
colloquialism, a thousand flowers were allowed to bloom.231 According to Madison, the real
danger in any democracy was not factionalization, but the emergence of a single tyrannical
faction. Interest groups forced to swim in a diverse sea of competitors would have a harder time
forming uncomplicated, dominant, and persistent majorities. Anticipating Kanchan Chandra’s
work on ethnic politics, Madison argued that, in a broad and diverse union, factions are forced to
adopt moderate policy positions in order to form majorities and maintain the support of members
who have cross-affiliations with other factions.232
The operation of dynamic stability is ubiquitous in persistent societies, even those that
undergo episodes of turmoil. Among the Nuer, it is visible in the cross-secting affiliations of
agnate group, lineage, village, economic engagement, and marriage. In “advanced” society it is
evident in the operations of politics and civil society. The same phenomenon is evident on the
international stage, where trade, treaties, immigration, and the maintenance of diplomatic ties
serve as essential tools for regulating and controlling conflict between sovereign countries by
creating lines of interdependence, building bulwarks of affiliation against inevitable tides of
conflict.233
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There is, of course, much more that can be said about the details of dynamic stability and
its role in preserving public order. For present purposes, however, it is enough to have this
sketch in mind as we move in the next Section to a discussion of how regimes become abusive
and how otherwise normal people, people just like you and me, become agents of atrocity.
B.

Mass Violence and the Loss of Dynamic Stability

In most states, a robust system of overlapping associations provides overall stability by
counterbalancing segmentary pressures with collateral lines of cohesion. What distinguishes
abusive regimes from stable states is a catastrophic failure in this web of dynamic stability; a
shift that is normally precipitated by crisis.234 In contrast with stable states, where there is a
dynamic balance of diverse associations and oppositions, abusive regimes are dominated by one
associational identity. That dominance reifies a corollary line of opposition and limits the ability
of cross-secting terms of association and identification to preserve the broader and more
inclusive systems of social cohesion that restrain violence.235 This pathological segmentation
leads to a momentary lapse in the “general need for peace, and recognition of a moral order in
which this peace can flourish,”236 opening the door to violent realization of the normative and
teleological mainstays of abusive paradigms.
The collapse of dynamic stability was evident in Nazi Germany, for example. While
eliminationist anti-Semitism was a persistent thread in the social fabric of early 20th Century
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Germany, Aryans, Jews, Romani, and other non-Aryans lived in relative peace because lines of
social, economic, and even family association cross-cut the racial divide.237 What precipitated
the Holocaust was the suppression of those cross-associations and the alignment of antiSemitism with nationalism.238 The exclusive claim on authentic national identity asserted by a
core group obsessed with racial purity rendered any commitment to continued association with
those not of Aryan descent unpatriotic—an act of faithlessness not just to race but to country as
well.239 Had race not assumed this position of dominance as the defining line of opposition and
association then the Holocaust simply would not have happened, at least not on a scale that
required the service, support, and accommodation of countless willing executioners.
The Rwandan genocide followed a similar pattern. There was a history of ethnic tension
in the country long before 1994. There were even episodes of violence. However, that violence
was constrained by innumerable cross-secting lines of association. Many Hutus and Tutsis were
married. Hutus and Tutsis attended the same churches and schools. They were business
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associates and sat across from each other in bureaucratic offices.240 All that changed in early
1994 when rumblings about a Tutsi uprising from Burundi gave Hutu Power leaders in Rwanda
the evidence they needed to bind national security to ethnic purity.241 As in Nazi Germany,
national identity in Rwanda was collapsed into ethnic identity as the paradigm of Hutu Power
rose to dominance with its historical narrative and social ontology of ethnic supremacy. Those
who retained a commitment to their Tutsi family, friends, and associates were identified as
sympathizers and put to death alongside their loved ones because they chose to identify with the
wrong side of the defining social line.
While it is at least conceptually possible that a society may permanently fall prey to a
paradigm of abuse;242 far more common are cases of punctuated violence during which the
paradigm—the truth regime—of one group gains temporary hegemony and exploits that
dominance in an attempt to destroy permanently one or more opposing groups. In other words,
mass atrocities mark moments of crisis. That crisis may be years or generations in the making,
and may last months, decades, or even centuries. What is striking, however, is the near universal
240

See Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of The Role and Effectiveness of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the
Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. Int’l L.J. 163, 166-67 (2000); Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law
Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda’s Domestic Genocide Trials, 29
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 545, 555 (1998).

241

Gourevitch, supra note 82, at 47-62; see also Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and
Ngeze, ICTR-99-52-T (Dec. 3, 2003); Colette Braeckman, Incitement to Genocide, in Crimes
of War 192 (Roy Gutmann & David Rieff, eds., 1999); Human Rights Watch, Leave None to
Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (1999), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda.

242

Derrick Bell has argued that this is precisely the condition we find with race in the United
States where, he argues, opposition to blacks allows whites from a host of otherwise opposed
groups to unite behind their shared interest in perpetuating a racist society. See Derrick Bell,
Race, Racism and American Law 29-30 (1980).
48

Extraordinary Justice

phenomenon of incomprehension among abusers and victims when the violence ends. In the
wake of mass atrocity, participants frequently join Walter Benjamin’s Angel of History, looking
in bewilderment at their bloody hands and destroyed lives and wondering how on earth this
could have happened.243 That confusion signals the resurfacing of what had been forgotten, or at
least suppressed: the lines of association between victims and abusers. The remainder of Article
suggests that this bewilderment signals a critical opportunity for transitional justice in general
and reparations in particular. Part V sets the stage by placing transitional justice as extraordinary
justice in the broader context of social transformations.

V.

Extraordinary Justice

Reviewing the transitional justice literature, Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein note
that “there is no theoretical foundation that underlies the concept of social repair.”244
Recognizing that stability is actually a dynamic achievement consequent of multiple and diverse
frontiers of alignment and dissociation helps span this lacuna by providing a crucial insight into
both how transitions can achieve sustainable peace and the proper role of reparations in the
process. Specifically, it suggests that the key to achieving peace is to reconstitute the web of
cross-cutting and overlapping lines of association and opposition that allows healthy—or, at
least, less pathological—states to maintain dynamic stability in the face of segmentary forces.
The political goal in transition is, then, less a project of wholesale creation than an effort to reconstitute a version of what was lost in crisis by re-presenting society to itself and its members to
243
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one another as co-residents in a social system more complicated than that which was accepted as
Truth under the recently-dominant abusive paradigm. That goal is best pursued not by erasing
from the public political field the line of opposition implicated in past abuses. Rather, the goal is
to situate that opposition in a broader context of overlapping associations245 so as to remove the
ontological linkage between being Hutu, say, and absolute economic, social, political, and
historical privilege.246 Properly conceived, reparations are well-suited to this task.
Transitions are Janus-faced.247 That is, in at least two respects, transitions occupy a
unique place “betwixt and between”248 the horrors of the past and the promise of the future.
First, in addition to being fields of contest for the soul of a post-transitional society, transitions
are fields of contest between the past and the future.249 Transitions and transitional justice are
not retrospective only;250 neither are they strictly prospective.251 Rather, they are located in a
temporal position between past and future. While that is trivially true whenever it is we find
ourselves—the command to “live in the present” amounts to tautology, after all—it is true in a
more significant sense in transitions, which must maintain an orientation to both the past and the
future. “The past” in transitions is a period marked by systematic and targeted human rights
245
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violations perpetrated under the authority of an abusive paradigm and through the guidance of an
abusive regime.252 “The future” is the aspiration for peace, security, and respect for human
rights and the rule of law. So, while we all, at least in a colloquial sense, exist in the moment
between past and future, transitions exist in a liminal period removed from a horrific past and not
yet reintegrated into the world of the post-transitional future.253
Second, transitions are Janus-faced in a normative sense. Transitions are not solely
concerned with documenting, accounting for, and punishing past wrongs based on preexisting
norms. Neither are transitions solely prospective, indulging oblivion in favor of an exclusive
focus on achieving peace and stability going forward.254 Rather, transitions are called upon to
account for the past as a part of the effort to go forward toward an aspirationally described
future.255 This is true in a definitional sense: The future of a transitional state is defined in many
ways by its opposition to the past. It is also true in a transformative sense: The core transitional
project, inclusive of transitional justice, is to transform an abusive and violent society into a
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peaceful regime committed to human rights and the rule of law.256 In this respect, transitions
mark a moment of political liminality in which a transitioning society is called upon to achieve a
change in status both for the whole and for individuals. So understood, the past serves as a sort
of negative regulatory ideal cast prospectively as the transitional justice imperative: “Nunca
Mas.”257
The invocation of “liminality” and transformation here may seem a bit obscure, and
deserves brief explanation. I take the term and concept from a group of mid-Twentieth Century
anthropologists, including most prominently Victor Turner, who questioned the dominant modes
of synchronic structural analysis in cultural ethnography.258 Rather than examining cultural
phenomena as static structures, these ethnographers focused on cultural process.259 They viewed
culture generally, and politics in particular, not as frozen structures, but diachronically.260 Much
of that work came out of 19th Century ethnographic work on rites of passage that was condensed
in Arnold Van Gennep’s classic The Rites of Passage.261 Rites of passage are common to all
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societies262 and track the passage of an individual from one “relatively fixed or stable condition”
to another.263 While the forms and purposes of rites of passage vary widely, ranging from ritual
circumcision264 and formal education,265 to marriage266 and death,267 they all share the same
basic form marked by separation from the profane social order, transformation from one status or
role to another, and reincorporation into society in the new status or role.268
The main action in rites of passage is in the transformational or “liminal” phase.269 The
primary task in the liminal phase is to experiment with identities and to acquire the knowledge
and skills necessary to life in a future role.270 This transformation is accomplished through an
abandonment of the status structure that orders profane society.271 Neophytes are altered in
psychic, symbolic, intellectual, and frequently physical ways through a host of sometimes quite
playful interactions that entail inversions of normal relations and identities that would otherwise
constitute violations of cultural taboos.272 Experimentation in this liminal environment of “anti262
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structure”273 is part of a process both creative and constructive; a new identity for the initiate is
simultaneously created and inscribed upon her. Stripped of external structural reference, liminal
processes also frequently give rise to a spontaneous sense of collective enterprise among
participants, what Turner calls “communitas.”274
The process structures revealed by ethnographic analyses of rites of passage appear
wherever there is movement from one social status or condition to another,275 including contests
between different cultural paradigms, which Turner calls “social dramas.”276 These contests
focus on “exclusion rules,”277 the norms applied to organize social status by defining lines of
opposition and association. Political conflicts on this view are contests among “boundarymaintaining mechanisms” for the privilege of assigning status to subjects and organizing social
relations.278 These conflicts, like rites of passage, progress through major stages of separation,
liminal transformation, and reintegration.279
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The stages of rites of passage as replicated on the larger scale of social dramas have
obvious application to transitions280 and help answer fundamental questions posed in the
literature about how to achieve the “norm creation” necessary to sustainable peace and security
in and after transition.281 Transitions are fields of contest between two competing paradigms.282
The first is the abusive paradigm with its attendant ontological views on natural hierarchies,
hopes for an end of history in which the dominant group’s position is permanently assured, and
permissive views on targeting individuals in the oppressed group for violent treatment. The
competing paradigm is partially defined by its opposition to the core elements of the old regime.
However, it also features positive commitments to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
Transitions, standing “betwixt and between” these two paradigms, are quintessentially liminal.
The challenge in any transition is to define for a post-transitional regime a new social
paradigm, a new set of boundary maintaining mechanisms and exclusion rules, and new modes
of public engagement that can provide grounds for a sustainable peace.283 This does not imply
that the process of experimentation and definition in transitions is a free-flying balloon,
unconnected from the real demands of a struggling society. Quite to the contrary, contests over
post-transitional public identity quite often play out in concrete debates about constitutions, the
allocation of resources, and access to institutional power. Liminal processes of transition are
280
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also tethered to the specific society, its history, the experiences of its members, and its hopes for
the future.284 As is set forth at length above, abusive regimes represent a loss of dynamic
stability through the emergence of a particular line of opposition and association to nearcomplete dominance.285 When looking forward, transitions therefore look to the period before
the abusive paradigm took control in order to access the diversity of collateral associations and
oppositions that once restrained segmentary violence in that society.286 In an almost
Rousseauvian287 sense, then, successful transitions and post-transitional paradigms must pay
attention to context and seek to offset the boundary maintaining mechanisms of an abusive
paradigm with competing modes of association and opposition indigenous to and appropriate for
that society and its members.288
To sum up a bit, post-transitional identities are not wholly novel. Rather, they are
composed at least in part by restoring collateral social statuses that cross-cut groups and which
provided stability in the past but were repressed or forgotten while the abusive regime held sway.
As part of that agenda, transitions must reorder status distinctions at the core of abusive practices
by connecting individuals in those groups to a broader web of associations and oppositions so
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that, for example, the line between Aryan and Jew, Hutu and Tutsi, Man and Woman, no longer
marks a hierarchy of entitlement.289 Transitions also require restructuring of society more
broadly, which is best achieved through healthy political contests among competing social
paradigms. Paying attention to these liminal goals provides useful guidance for the main
components of a hybrid program of transitional justice.
Truth and reconciliation committees, for example, are sometimes touted as efforts to
“assert a sense of control after a horrific and chaotic human tragedy.”290 Part of that project is
forensic, reflecting a need to come to terms with the past by establishing the facts of what
happened, free from the evidentiary constraints imposed in criminal trials.291 Set in the context
of a broader effort to reestablish the overlapping associations constitutive of dynamic stability,
another benefit of Truth Commissions comes to the fore. In addition to establishing facts, Truth
Commissions provide an opportunity for victims to tell their stories and to be recognized in a
formal official setting.292 Abusers are invited to join the larger transitional society in recognizing
former victims as full human beings who inhabited a lifeworld rich and diverse in points of
association. They are asked to see their victims not only as Jews, but as mothers, botanists,
oenophiles, and teachers as well.293
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Criminal trials also have a liminal role in transitions.294 In addition to straightforward
retributive and utilitarian demands that frequently provide ground and guidance for criminal
trials in stable states, transitions also use trials as opportunities to mark a clear and definitive
break with the past by condemning those responsible. Viewed through the lens of a broader
effort to correct the status imbalance at the center of an abusive paradigm, criminal trials also
provide an opportunity to raise the status of victims by putting public resources behind the effort
to vindicate their rights as citizens. On the other side of the ledger, criminal trials, by
condemning abusers, reject the claim of status entitlement that provided a foundation for their
past wrongs.295 That opportunity is, of course, at its apex in prosecutions of high-level leaders
and other public officials who propounded and institutionalized the paradigm of abuse.
As part of a larger hybrid program of extraordinary justice, reparations have an important
role to play as well. The next Part makes that case.
VI.

The Liminal Role of Reparations in Transitions to Democracy

“[T]he willingness to give compensation, even the recognition that one should give
it, does not necessarily express agent-regret, and the preparedness to compensate
can present itself at very different levels of significance . . . [including an
awareness that] his actions might have some reparative significance other than
compensation.”
—Bernard Williams296
Commenting on a core deficit in the domestic reparations debate, Alford Brophy notes
that “a critical problem with reparations is that reparationists have not yet specified what they
294
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want.”297 That omission is derivative of a broader failure to understand the unique conditions of
mass violence and their normative and substantive consequences for transitional justice as
extraordinary justice. Accounting for reparations as a core element of extraordinary justice
reveals that reparations are best understood and justified as symbolic and material measures for
achieving status and participatory parity among former victims and former abusers by
reconstituting the robust web of association and opposition constitutive of dynamic stability.
A.

The Pathological Potential of Status Inequality

“Deep rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; ten thousand recollections, by
the blacks, of the injuries they have sustained; new provocations, the real
distinctions which nature has made; and many other circumstances, will divide us
into parties, and produce convulsions which will probably never end but in the
extermination of the one or the other race.”
—Thomas Jefferson298
If the account of abusive regimes set forth above is right, then mass atrocities are a
special case of inequality consequent of a catastrophic failure in the system of overlapping
associations and oppositions constitutive of a dynamically stable political society.299 The brand
of inequality in evidence is not the traditional target of liberal politics and philosophy. There the
concern is inequality in the distribution of resources.300 While distributional injustice frequently
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is a consequence of or consonant with the inequality at the core of abusive regimes, the main
driver of atrocities is a version of what Nancy Fraser has called “status inequality.”301
The phrase “status inequality” may seem redundant. For example, Max Weber defined
“status” as “a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of honor . . . connected with any
quality shared by the plurality.”302 Following Weber’s lead, Fraser defines “status” as
“represent[ing] an order of intersubjective subordination derived from institutionalized patterns
of cultural value that constitute some members of society as less than full partners in
interaction.”303 “Status” in this sense documents a stratification of social identities, and links
position in that hierarchy to norms of affinity and association.304 Status plays a prominent role in
describing and regulating the lifeworlds of individuals. It encompasses horizontal and vertical
relationships, ordering groups and therefore individuals according to a background ontology
reflective of hard normative categories or common public and private practice.305
With this brief exposition, the oddity of the phrase “status inequality” is clear. The whole
notion of status implies inequality: a vertical relationship among individuals or groups. Those
vertical relationships can be quite consequential. Membership in a group frequently comes with
301
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entitlements. Life projects often are defined and measured by movement from one group to
another. However, the hierarchical implications of status are usually constrained by the
phenomenon of multiple overlapping memberships entailed in dynamic stability. That is, by
virtue of the fact that all individuals are members of multiple groups, uncomplicated claims of
superiority are impossible, or at least implausible, in relatively healthy societies. Taking a step
back, the same phenomenon multiplied over a broader population makes impossible or
implausible group claims of hegemony or permanent entitlement. “Status” in relatively healthy
and stable societies does not, therefore, necessarily imply “inequality,” at least in any sense that
would implicate serious justice concerns.
As evidenced by abusive regimes, the leveling effect of dynamic stability sometimes goes
awry. Specifically, the significance of membership in a particular group may become so
totalizing that the potential to establish meaningful collateral lines of affiliation through
membership in other groups effectively is eliminated. In these circumstances, membership in a
particular group assumes a position of such prominence that it conclusively determines access to
material, social, or political goods, regardless of collateral associations through other group
identities. It is this pathological extreme that marks abusive regimes.
“Status inequality” in this more pathological sense is “rooted . . . in the status order of
society, as institutionalized patterns of cultural value” that presents those in the target group as
“perverse and despised.”306 “Pervasively institutionalized,” these “value patterns structure broad
swaths of social interaction” and are “codified in many areas of law,” “entrenched in many areas
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of government policy,” and “also pervade popular culture and everyday interaction.”307 The
result is a structured “status subordination,” which imagines those in the target group as proper
objects for a host of unsavory treatment, including “shaming and assault,” “exclusion from rights
and privileges,” “demeaning stereotypical depictions,” “harassment and disparagement,” and
“denial of full rights and equal protections of citizenship.”308
This description of status inequality arising to status subordination and its attachment to
broader social norms and public practices is by now familiar. It is identical in all significant
ways to Foucault’s regimes of truth and Turner’s social paradigms.309 The application of these
concepts is sharpened now, identifying the root of injustice, including institutionalized human
rights abuses, as the production of pathological status inequality through social institutions such
that members are presented as appropriate objects for abuse.310 Abusive paradigms are simply
engines for the ordered production of pathological status inequality.311 The next two sections
elaborate the impact of this insight for reparations.
B.

Recognition, Status Parity, and Reconstituting Dynamic Stability

The consequence of pathological status inequality is that it excludes some individuals
from recognition despite their positions along many associational lines because they are
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members of an oppositionally defined target group.312 While conflict across groups is common,
and in many respects inevitable given that most social goods are limited, the effect of
intersecting membership is to render members of groups subject to segmentary forces mutually
comprehensible through collateral associations. As a consequence, oppositions usually play
themselves out in stable societies outside of the shadow of mass or sustained violence because
parties recognize each other as fellows and associates worthy of respect if not care. Where a
network of collateral associations is functionally absent, or limited in its capacity to provide this
balance, societies produce abuses ranging from punctuated violence to persistent social injustice.
The ability to recognize self in other and the place of recognition in debates about social
justice is a mainstay of political theory after Hegel313 and plays a key role in contemporary
debates about public identity.314 Social justice claims by women and minorities are routinely
cast as demands for recognition.315 While recognition deficits in fields of race and gender
usually result in persistent patterns of injustice in relatively stable regimes, such as segregation
and patriarchy, a brief history of how justice movements in these areas have developed is
revealing of the task facing transitions.
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In the early stages of the women’s movement, for example, status claims were couched in
the language of equality.316 The critical agenda was to disclaim gender as an oppositional
category in favor of identifying individual women along collateral lines of association. By
focusing on citizenship rights or professional qualifications, women hoped to make the case that
gender was not a significant status marker. Justice claims in these first waves of feminism
therefore focused on formal equality.317 Later generations of feminists shifted the ground a bit,
but also focused on recognition claims. Where early feminism sought recognition as equals by
leaving gender at the door, later critics reintroduced difference into the debate, demanding
recognition for women not as genderless participants in public life, but as women.318 This shift
was informed by the experiences of earlier feminists who found that full participation in a range
of endeavors required women to exist as male beneficiaries of patriarchy with little or no
domestic or reproductive responsibilities. Formal equality therefore came with an unacceptable
price. Women faced the choice to pursue their careers at the cost of child-bearing and rearing or
to sacrifice their careers in whole or significant part in order to reproduce or pursue a full family
life. Confronted with this Hobson’s choice, feminists reformulated their demands for
recognition, arguing that certain accommodations were necessary to provide women with full
recognition. While maintaining calls for equal pay and a workplace free from gender
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discrimination, feminists began to foment for maternity leave, available day care, and
flextime.319 Rather than subordinating gender, this new vanguard of gender critics revealed that
full recognition of women would require recasting the position of gender in the matrix of
segmentary identity in such a way that women and men could make legitimate justice claims
both in light of and despite their gender.
A similar shift in the form of recognition claims occurred in racial politics and debates
about multiculturalism and group rights.320 As opposed to earlier movements, where purported
racial and ethnic differences were suppressed or dissolved in the context of claims for formal
equality, multiculturalism and claims for group rights proceeded on the ground that full
recognition would require public appreciation for and, where appropriate, accommodation of,
difference.
These shifts in the forms of recognition claims in contests over gender and racial justice
precipitated a broader debate among liberals, who continued to pursue distributional justice as
the end of equality, and post-modernists, who engaged in a critical hermeneutics of status and
difference in pursuit of recognition as a standard of justice.321 I do not need to take a position in
these debates. However, it is clear that pre-transitional abuses cannot adequately be explained by
distributional disparities. There certainly are distributional dimensions to abuses perpetrated by
and under pre-transitional regimes. However, the central driver of mass and institutionalized
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atrocities is an abusive paradigm which allows perpetrators to objectify their victims and to avoid
recognizing shared associations.
Given that pre-transitional abuses are, in essence, the product of recognition failures, the
central transitional task is to achieve between former victims and former abusers an acceptable
level of status parity. The path to that end is clear. First, transitions must construct or
reconstitute a system of collateral associations that can serve as context for the dominant lines of
opposition recruited to organize and justify past abuses.322 By reconstituting the network of
associations constitutive of dynamic stability, transitions seek recognition of former victims as
citizens, professionals, and spouses rather than mere subhumans.323 Second, transitions must
demand recognition for former victims as members of the targeted group who, by virtue of their
shared history, occupy a unique place in society.324 In short, the project of seeking justice for
victims in transitions is one not only on of seeking equality, but also on of recognizing difference
without reifying any particular line of opposition and association.325 Full recognition, and
therefore status parity, requires both.
These concrete goals refer to a deeper effort to provide former victims “a place at the
knowledge-creating table.”326 One of the primary tools of atrocity is occupation of truth

322

Glucksman, supra note 175, at 25-26.

323

Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 47, at 2327, 2332.

324

Vandeginste, supra note 14, at 148.

325

Chandra, supra note 176, at 247.

326

Lundy & McGovern, supra note 141, at 109 (quoting Budd Hall, I Wish This Were a Poem of
Practices of Participatory Research, in Handbook of Action Research: Participative Inquiry
and Practice 176 (Reason and Bradbury, eds., 2001)).
66

Extraordinary Justice

generating regimes. This includes dominance of the social pathways of identity generation:
Public histories, political institutions, and influential organs of civil society. Rewriting terms of
inclusion and exclusion requires adding chairs at the table, providing former victims the
opportunity to participate as equals in the creative process of statecraft and institution building at
the heart of transitions.327 Constitution writing is one example,328 because it provides crucial
opportunities to model participatory parity by including former victims in the process,329 but
there are others, including the political processes leading to truth commissions.330
Making this point reemphasizes that the project of transitional justice is more than a
process of mere “legalism.”331 Legal procedures may have an important role to play in an
overall project of achieving parity between former victims and abusers. There is no more
poignant way to make a statement that someone matters than to prosecute and punish those who
abuse her. The opposite also is true, which is why impunity for acts of targeted violence is a
mainstay of abusive regimes.332 Juridical approaches to justice have their role, then, but must be
understood in a broader context. The true and proper goal of transition is the reconstruction of
social order in such a way that former victims and abusers are captured in a more complicated
web of associations and oppositions that renders impossible future violence consequent of
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pathological status inequality.333 As the next Section argues, reparations have a unique role to
play in this process.
C.

Reparations and Extraordinary Justice

Ordinary justice does not take a systematic interest in what inspires, compels, or justifies
wrongdoers.334 Motive is not a necessary element of the prima facie case for common law
crimes. That is because the psycho-social factors underlying most stable state crime is relatively
idiosyncratic. Mass atrocities are extraordinary by comparison because they access, reflect, and
express an abusive paradigm that is endorsed and extended by public and private institutions and
civil society. What distinguishes an instance of transitional justice from ordinary justice is the
practical and normative demand to take account of the abusive paradigm underlying constituent
acts of mass violence.335 Abusive paradigms vary in content, but share a common path and
structure. They isolate and privilege a particular line of opposition from the broader milieu of
333
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overlapping associational identities and link that opposition to a social ontology and historical
teleology. The result is an institutionalized status inequality that organizes and justifies targeted
violence. Transitions mark the liminal period between an abusive past and a future committed to
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Transitional justice is extraordinary because it is
an element of this transformation and therefore embraces as an imperative the need to address
and correct status disparities between former victims and abusers.
While abusive regimes share a basic form, the history and nature of the abusive
paradigms that lie beneath them are unique and give rise to distinct programs of abuse. There are
similarities, of course, but indigenous differences reflect a real diversity among cultures of abuse.
In recognition of these differences, I have argued elsewhere that the form and extension of
criminal trials in any particular transition must be determined by an internal deliberative process
and tailored to past, present, and future circumstances in that state.336 Alex Boraine has made the
same point in regard to truth commissions.337 Reparations programs also must be context
sensitive and situation specific.338 Therefore, it would be only by folly of arrogance that this
Article could draw conclusions about what forms of reparation are universally required. The
claim here is much more modest and general: If abusive regimes act out abusive paradigms
organized around maintaining structural disparities in status between those in the target group
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and those not, then reparations are most persuasively justified in the context of the transitional
project of correcting those disparities.
To achieve parity for victims, transitions must focus on two goals. First, transitions must
recognize former victims as equal members of society deserving of basic respect, protection, and
equal access to all spheres of public and private life. This requires dismantling the normative
and institutional structures that dominated the prior regime.339 Given the bi-polar logic
implicated in an abusive paradigm, it is tempting to think that recognition is best advanced by
dissolving entirely the oppositional line that marked the boundary between abuser and victim in
the past. However, to do so would be to indulge in what Pablo De Greiff has condemned as
“oblivion.”340 Oblivion risks distorting the truth about the past, but it also denies former victims
full recognition by disclaiming or ignoring the role of a shared history in shaping their
identities.341 Rather than oblivion, the transitional goal of achieving recognition for victims is
best pursued by constructing or reconstituting a robust web of collateral associations.342 The
goal is not to be blind to race, gender, ethnicity, or religion. Rather, the task is to understand
race, gender, ethnicity, and religion in a broader context in which these categories are important
for personal identity but do not provide grounds for systematic inequality. At a minimum, then,
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association with a particular ethnic group, say, must be decoupled from pathological status
inequality across parallel lines of association and opposition so that ethnicity does not imply
poverty, exclusion from political participation, or denial of educational opportunities. By
reconstituting a network of associations constitutive of dynamic stability, transitional justice
programs can provide recognition for former victims while building bulwarks against resurgence
of an abusive paradigm.
Even when explained in the broader context of abusive paradigms and dynamic stability,
justice as recognition is in some ways an abstract pursuit. The second transitional condition of
parity for former victims is more concrete. While formal recognition is nice, it may ring hollow
if members of a victim group still find themselves on the outside of public and private life.
Declarations that the age of discrimination and targeted violence is over are hard to take
seriously if victims do not have the opportunity and means to participate as equals in politics, the
economy, and civil society. The transitional commitment to parity therefore requires more than
formal recognition; it requires providing the material means necessary to achieve what Nancy
Fraser calls “participatory parity,” which allows “members of society to interact with one another
as peers.”343 Transitions therefore must take practical measures to dismantle the “social
arrangements [that] institutionalize deprivation”344 and the “systems of power which [otherwise
would] produce and sustain”345 an abusive paradigm by excluding those in a targeted group from
the full protections and privileges of public and private life.
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So, achieving parity in the transitional justice context requires attentiveness both to the
subjective experiences of former victims and to the social norms and public institutions
constitutive of an abusive paradigm. Recognition, as part of this project, requires “return[ing] to
victims some sense of moral worth and dignity,” “foster[ing] public trust in state institutions,”
“forc[ing] a society to reconceptualize its sense of identity,” “help[ing to] undermine perpetrator
narratives that justified past atrocities,“ and “promot[ing] a critical reinterpretation of a nation’s
history.”346 However, parity must be more than formal acknowledgement; it must provide a real
path for former victims to participate as equals in public and private life.347 Reparations, as
constituents of a holistic transitional justice program, are uniquely well-placed to pursue these
goals.
Jean Hampton has argued that what is at stake in moral wrongs is a concretized
disequilibrium between abuser and abused.348 “A person behaves wrongfully in a way that
effects a moral injury to another when she treats that person in a way that is precluded by that
person’s value, and/or by representing him as worth far less than his actual value; or, in other
words, when the meaning of her action is such that she diminishes him, and by doing so,
represents herself as elevated with respect to him, thereby according herself a value that she does
not have.”349 Understanding pre-transitional abuses in this light clarifies the purpose and goal of
symbolic reparations such as apologies, opportunities to testify before truth commissions,
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remembrance holidays, and public monuments. A public apology is not and should not be a pro
forma mea culpa. Rather, it is elemental of a therapeutic process in which a transitional society
acknowledges that what was done was wrong, condemns the public norms and institutional
practices that enabled and rationalized the abuse, and states a commitment to prevent a
recurrence by doing the hard work of analysis and reform.350 An apology is a moment of mutual
recognition, in the present yet Janus-faced. It is a condemnation of the past, but also a
commitment to change.351 Official public apologies as symbolic reparations recognize that past
abuses reified a pathological status inequality. Going forward, public apologies provide a
redeemable commitment to reorder society and to respect the equal status of victims.352
Likewise, the opportunity to give testimony in a truth commission is not just an
accommodation to a pitiable wretch so he may air his suffering. Rather, it is a moment of
formal, institutional, and public recognition of both the speaker and his story.353 “[N]eglecting
or expunging the historical record is a way of undermining and insulting [former victims].”354
Providing an opportunity for public testimony sends the clear message that this person matters,
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what happened to him matters, and that he and his suffering are deserving of official attention.355
This is precisely the recognition that victims of institutionalized abuse are denied under an
abusive regime.356 Days of remembrance and public monuments provide recurring or permanent
forms of recognition, reconfirming the fact that former victims and the abuses they suffered
matter and must not be forgotten.357
Symbolic reparations can also play an important role in creating or reconstituting the
overlapping associations and oppositions constitutive of dynamic stability. Cast in the
background of an abusive paradigm, abuses perpetrated in pre-transitional regimes are material
expressions of pathological status inequality. They express a strict parallelism among various
lines of opposition and association, excluding as unworthy members of a targeted group from
privileged social spheres—being Tutsi, say, implies exclusion from jobs, schools, property
ownership, membership in the country club, and basic protections from physical violence
afforded to full citizens. Symbolic reparations provide public and official acknowledgement that
this strict and exclusive parallelism is unjustified. Looking back, symbolic measures recall with
approval times when members of the victim class were numbered among the privileged even as
they look forward, recognizing victims’ future right to equal access. For example, testimony at a
truth commission might focus on the fact that Tutsis once worked alongside Hutus at all levels of
government and industry, that they were members of the same church congregations and clubs,
and that they were treasured friends, spouses, and family members. Public apologies can support
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that history by recognizing that ethnic identity never should have been used as a tool to exclude.
Monuments and holidays can express a commitment to reject ethnic identity as a marker of
exclusion and tool of status inequality going forward by providing continuous or recurring
reminders in the public calendar. At the threshold of a new regime, then, a well-conceived
program of symbolic reparations has the potential to advance the liminal goal of social
transformation by laying the foundation for the dynamic stability necessary to guard against
future atrocities.
It is tempting to think that symbolic measures are sufficient to achieve status parity.
After all, if the foundation of abuse is all in the collective mind of an abusive regime, then it
appears to follow that all justice requires is to tweak those beliefs. However, public recognition,
even if heartfelt, may not be sufficient to provide victims with the material conditions necessary
to achieve, maintain, and exercise equal status, particularly in states where an abusive paradigm
has held sway long enough to produce pervasive disparities in wealth, achievement, and access
to public institutions.358 In these circumstances, providing symbolic reparations designed to
express a commitment to status equality without addressing distributional disparities consequent
of misrecognition is akin to granting title to the Duke of the Dump; amusing, but hardly
justice.359 Therefore, transitions frequently will need to provide some form of material
reparation.
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As with symbolic measures, material reparations are best justified and organized by the
transitional justice goal of achieving parity for former victims. Money payments without context
are dangerous. They can engender resentment among those made to pay, who may regard the
shifting of resources from the dominant group to the oppressed group as a form of “oppressive
communitarianism.”360 Forced transfers also run the risk of inverting or at least reaffirming
without contextualizing the lines of opposition central to the predecessor paradigm.361 To avoid
these dangers, material reparations, whether given to individual victims or to targeted groups
more broadly, should focus on reforming the public face of law and resolving status disparities
going forward. In this context, material reparations often are necessary to provide former
victims with meaningful access to social spheres to which they were structurally denied access
under an abusive regime.362 This is a necessary step on the path to establishing the network of
overlapping identities necessary to achieving sustainable and dynamic stability. Material
reparations also give physical dimension to losses and harms that otherwise would be lost to the
fogs of oblivion.363 As an exchange, reparations can also create a link between abusers and
victims, individually and as members of groups.364 The process of negotiating reparations can
also play an important role in achieving status parity by forcing former abusers to recognize their

360

Fraser, supra note 187, at 7, 75-76.

361

Id. at 7, 76-77, 92.

362

Vandeginste, supra note 14, at 157.

363

Hamber & Wilson, supra note 280, at 14.

364

Id. at 14.
76

Extraordinary Justice

former victims as legitimate claimants of material and social justice.365 Finally, regardless of
form, material reparations recognize the status of former victims as a citizens whose suffering is
worthy of acknowledgement.366
Material reparations may not be sufficient compensation for past harms, but to make that
point is to miss the point. Like more symbolic measures, the measure of sufficiency for material
reparations is their ability to advance or achieve the goal of status and participatory parity.367
Consistent with a point made by Saul Levmore and others, this approach to reparations does not
advocate for compensating harm, which implies finality in the social processes of justice.368
Rather, reparations are justified only to the extent that they advance and concretize social
change.369 Reparations programs therefore must specify the source and form of past wrongs,
identify constraints on individual and broader social justice, and tailor reparations strategies that
enhance the ability of former victims to participate as equals in society, culture, politics, and the
economy.370
While the main lines of an abusive paradigm can be painted with a broad brush, the
realities frequently are more complicated at an atomic level. Achieving complete participatory
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parity for individual victims requires more bespoke measures.371 If the abusive paradigm that
held sway in the past systematically denied those in the targeted group fair and equal access to
housing, for example, then material reparations in the form of loan programs or building projects
may be necessary to put victims on equal footing going forward and to help identify them as
rightful members of the propertied class.372 Similarly, if an abusive paradigm systematically
denied those in the targeted group access to the educational, economic, social, and political
opportunities that serve as gateways to full participation in society, then reparations in the form
of preschool or tutoring programs, access guarantees, integration, and targeted institutional
development may be necessary to accelerate the arrival of former victims into circles of privilege
and power.373
Failing to attend to status parity as a core measure and goal of transitional justice opens
the door to a host of legal and social response mechanisms that can effectively deny substantive
justice to former victims even as they are afforded formal justice. For example, in the
Antebellum South, efforts to end slavery met with a host of subtle responses evincing resistance
to the prospect of recognizing blacks as social, political, and economic equals.374 Those
strategies were expanded and deployed more broadly across the American South after the Civil
War to form the structures of Jim Crow and segregation that perpetuated pathological status
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inequality even in the face of formal constitutional equality.375 In some cases, because the
underlying social structures of abuse were not addressed in the transition, “[l]aws that were
intended to bring about equality were used to reinforce the existing inequality that slavery had
produced.”376 These reactionary responses were possible only because the transition represented
by Reconstruction was woefully inadequate to the task of achieving for former slaves any
semblance of parity with their oppressors. Race remained the defining feature of identity,
limiting access to economic, professional, and social statuses. Linking justice initiatives,
including reparations, to the achievement of participatory parity and dynamic stability is much
more likely to achieve lasting peace than these ordinary justice approaches,377 which define
reparations as nothing more than “payment[s] justified on backward-looking grounds of
corrective justice.”378

VII.

Reparations for Historic Abuses
“. . . all the struggles of African Americans in this country since 1690
have been to repair the damage of enslavement and white supremacy.”
—Audrey Moore379
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One of the most hostile environments for reparations proposals are circumstances where
decades and generations stand between those who will pay and receive reparations and those
who perpetrated and suffered wrongdoing.380 Those asked to pay protest that they did not do
anything wrong, and so should not be made to sacrifice.381 That objection is amplified by claims
that heirs to victims have not, themselves, suffered any wrong, and so should not receive what
would amount to an undeserved windfall382 for disparities in achievement that are ascribable to
their own lack of capacity or will to succeed.383 In the United States, these arguments are regular
players in contests over affirmative action384 and debates about reparations for slavery and
institutional racism.385 While the fact of past abuses is undeniable, those who oppose affirmative
action and racial reparations argue that the past is the past.
The response to these objections is evident in light of the foregoing discussion. The case
for reparations is not based on compensation for past wrongs. That is a tort concept germane to
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ordinary justice but ill-fitted to the central tasks for reparations in transitions, which are to pursue
status parity for former victims as both recognition and a meaningful opportunity to participate
as peers in public and private life. Those goals can only be achieved by keeping at the fore the
role of an abusive paradigm in pre-transitional abuses. So doing reveals that the path to justice in
transitions is to recast the central ethnic, religious, or racial opposition implicated in past wrongs
in the broader context of a varied pattern of overlapping associations and oppositions such that
being black, say, does not entail exclusion from citizenship, the practice of medicine, or
membership in the local golf club.
Reparations justified by and disciplined to this task are immune from claims by those
asked to sacrifice that they did no wrong, because their responsibility is not to pay for harms but
to make it right for their contemporaries and for future generations.386 This basic duty to social
justice, abstracted from particular harms, is not unlike the duty of all citizens to end
institutionalized abuses in the first place. Claims of innocence in the face of such demands are
simply irrelevant.387 What is relevant is what must be done to vindicate the transitional
commitment to achieve a just society in the shadow of an abusive paradigm.
While broad political and institutional changes frequently mark a moment of historical
recognition and commitment to change, the constituents of an abusive paradigm often linger,388
sometimes in pure and unadulterated form and sometimes as components of a synthetic posttransitional paradigm that preserves significant pathological elements. Where this occurs,
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disparate distribution of economic opportunities and success, along with continuing instances of
documented abuse and discrimination, provide evidence that status inequality reflective of an
abusive paradigm persists.389 Reparations treated as tools for changing these social and cognitive
structures of abuse, and for achieving parity for contemporary members of the targeted group,
retain a role in these situations of continuing transition.
Denial and revisionist history frequently are at the heart of lingering injustice. Symbolic,
group-centered reparations programs have a particularly useful role to play in these
circumstances. Museums, monuments, and official histories, for example, can provide
recognition of the past and express public commitments to “Nunca Mas.” More material groupbased reparations may also have a role to play. For example, public funding for advocacy groups
and community organizers can provide a valuable resource for those powerless to expose and
oppose conduct reflecting persistent commitments to a discriminatory paradigm. Programs
encouraging or guaranteeing access to education or even entry-level employment can help to
correct for the residues of discrimination by, again, recognizing that distributional disparities
consequent of historical injustices require affirmative action to correct,390 and by building
patterns of connection between victim groups and the social spheres from which they have been
historically excluded.
This approach to transitional justice and reparations is particularly useful in responding to
concerns expressed about affirmative action.391 Some critics claim that affirmative action
389
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programs reemphasize racial opposition, thereby preventing or delaying our transition to a raceblind society.392 By now, however, it is clear that this objection quite misunderstands both the
problem and the solution. The problem is not racial identity. To the contrary, race is an
important component of identity in a multi-racial society and can provide an important line of
association across parallel oppositions. Rather, the problem is when race, constructed as an
existential condition, maps onto other contingencies of social status.393 This is the definition of a
racist society: one that imposes and presupposes an alignment of race with a limited set of class,
social, professional, religious, and cultural associations, confining members of a particular race
to a social ghetto.394 The solution is not to abandon race as a component of identity, but to
disentangle race from these deleterious status implications. In fact, preserving race as a source
of identity may be crucial. For those who aspire to a particular status, it is important to see racial
colleagues among the cohort to which they strive. For a child, it matters that there are people
who look like her walking the halls of government, business, and academe. It creates links to
another life, and sends the message that her race is not an impediment, no matter the life she
imagines for herself.
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VIII. Conclusion
“The past is never dead. It’s not even the past.”
—William Faulkner395
In closing, it is worth considering Walter Benjamin’s image of the Angel of History:
“Angelus Novus” shows an angel looking as though he is about to
move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes
are staring; his mouth is open; his wings are spread. This is how
one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the
past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single
catastrophe that keeps piling ruin upon ruin and hurls it in front of
his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make
whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from
Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the
angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him
into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris
before him grows skyward.
This storm is what we call
396
progress.”
The record provides much evidence to recommend this apocalyptic view of progress. However,
we need not despair—at least not yet. This Article gives the Angel a second face. The progress
Benjamin describes is the natural consequence, the argument ad absurdum, of a particular social
paradigm allowed to define and pursue its own End of History. It is only in the wake of such
“progress” that the Angel can see the destructive force of a pathological social order. It is
tempting to think that real progress can be had by simply turning the Angel to face the future. To
do so, however, would literally be to turn a blind eye, dooming the world to repeat anew the
disasters of history shrouded by oblivion. The Angel of History therefore must adopt the
equipoise of Janus. For him, the debris of the past serves as a negative ideal, describing an
395
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aspirational trajectory for the future. By facing simultaneously the past and the future, the Angel
can see the prospect of true progress in the blood bath of history. While shame is a natural
emotion when the Angel is forced to live with the disasters of the past, his dual orientation
commits him to do justice in the liminal now for the future.397 To pursue such a goal is an
occasion of the greatest pride, not shame.398 Shame is appropriate only when the moment is
wasted by hollow claims that “This travesty is not my fault, so I have no responsibility to make it
right.” As has been argued here, claims such as these in the wake of mass or institutionalized
atrocities are simply non sequiturs. When presented the opportunity to pursue justice for those
who suffer as a consequence of persistent pathological status inequalities, the only question is
“Who will make it right?”
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